

PICJ

Professional Issues in Criminal Justice: A Professional Journal

<http://www.picj.org>

- 
- Three-Strikes Laws and Police Officer Murders: Do the Data Indicate a Correlation?** 9
James E. Guffey, James G. Larson, and Chandrika Kelso
- Community Oriented Policing and Community-Based Crime Reduction Programs: An Evaluation in New York City** 27
Anthony L. Sciarabba
- Understanding Staff Perceptions of Turnover in Corrections** 43
Kevin I. Minor, Cherie Dawson-Edwards, James B. Wells, Carl Griffith, and Earl Angel
- Trust in Police Officer-Sergeant Relationships** 59
T. Jacob Stull
- A Jail Guru Reminisces, Part 2** 71
Ken Kerle

Contents

Editor's Notes	v
Three-Strikes Laws and Police Officer Murders: Do the Data Indicate a Correlation? James E. Guffey, James G. Larson, and Chandrika Kelso	9
Community Oriented Policing and Community-Based Crime Reduction Programs: An Evaluation in New York City Anthony L. Sciarabba	27
Understanding Staff Perceptions of Turnover in Corrections Kevin I. Minor, Cherie Dawson-Edwards, James B. Wells, Carl Griffith, and Earl Angel	43
Trust in Police Officer-Sergeant Relationships T. Jacob Stull	59
A Jail Guru Reminisces, Part 2 Ken Kerle	71
Index	81

Professional Issues in Criminal Justice

Volume 4 Number 2 Summer 2009

Executive Editor

Frank J. DiMarino, LL.M., JD
Kaplan University
FDiMarino@kaplan.edu

Editor-in-Chief

Cliff E. Roberson, LL.M., PhD
Kaplan University
CRoberson@kaplan.edu

Associate Editor

Cloud H. Miller III, PhD
Kaplan University
CMiller@kaplan.edu

Copy Editor

Judy Plazyk

Web Coordinator

Stephen Velky

Editorial Office

Send submissions to
Editor-in-Chief Cliff Roberson
croberson@kaplan.edu
<http://www.picj.org/>

Executive Board

Karen Evans, PhD
Kaplan University

Katherine Jean Bennett, PhD
Armstrong Atlantic State University

Alejandro del Carmen, PhD
Kaplan University & University of Texas

Thomas Jurkanin, PhD
Kaplan University

William I. Weston, JD, PhD
Kaplan University

Copyright © 2009 Professional Issues in Criminal Justice (PICJ)/Kaplan University

Reviewers

Jose F. Anderson
The University of Baltimore

Katherine Jean Bennett
Armstrong Atlantic State University

Anita Neuberger Blowers
University of North Carolina at
Charlotte

Stephen A. Cernkovich
Bowling Green State University

Mitchell Bart Chamlin
University of Cincinnati

Adrian Derral Cheatwood
The Ohio State University

John K. Cochran
University of South Florida

Gordon Arthur Crews
Washburn University

Walter S. DeKeseredy
University of Ontario, Institute of
Technology

Mary Dodge
University of Colorado at Denver

William G. Doerner
Florida State University

William Evans
University of Nevada, Reno

David James Farabee
University of California, Los Angeles

Randy R. Gainey
Old Dominion University

Jill A. Gordon
Virginia Commonwealth University

Michael K. Hooper
California Commission on Peace
Officer Standards & Training

Sung Joon Jang
Louisiana State University

Paul Jesilow
University of California, Irvine

Wesley W. Johnson
University of Southern Mississippi

Paula M. Kautt
University of Cambridge

William R. King
Bowling Green State University

Jodi Lane
University of Florida

Edward J. Latessa
University of Cincinnati

Alan J. Lizotte
The University at Albany

Daniel Mabrey
Sam Houston State University

Cheryl Lee Maxson
University of California, Irvine

David C. May
Eastern Kentucky University

J. Mitchell Miller
University of Texas at San Antonio

Kevin I. Minor
Eastern Kentucky University

Scott M. Mire
University of Louisiana at Lafayette

Godpower O. Okereke
Texas A&M University-Texarkana

John L. Padgett
Capella University

Susan E. Pease
Central Connecticut State University

Mary E. Pelz
University of Houston-Downtown

Jeffrey Ian Ross
University of Baltimore

Reviewers

Eric L. Sevigny
University of Pittsburgh

Frank Shanty
The Cobra Institute

Kathleen Marie Littwin Simon
Appalachian State University

Barbara A. Sims
Penn State Harrisburg

Risdon Nichols Slate
Florida Southern College

Stephen G. Tibbetts
California State University, San
Bernardino

Sam Torres
California State University,
Long Beach

John E. Wade
Southeast Missouri State University

Lorenn Walker
University of Hawaii
School of Business

Julia F. Weber
Judicial Council of California

John L. Worrall
California State University, San
Bernardino

Jane A. Younglove
California State University, Stanislaus

Marvin Zalman
Wayne State University

Editor's Notes

In the first article in this issue of *PICJ*, "Three-Strikes Laws and Police Officer Murders: Do the Data Indicate a Correlation?," authors James E. Guffey, James G. Larson, and Chandrika Kelso focus on the issue that three-strikes laws may result in more second- and third-strike offenders resorting to assault and murder of police officers to avoid capture and almost-certain life in prison. The authors look at the statistical correlation between three-strikes laws and the murder of police officers in an attempt to determine whether a statistical correlation exists, and, if a correlation does exist, whether it provides a substantive argument in favor of the repeal of three-strikes legislation.

In the second article, "Community Oriented Policing and Community-Based Crime Reduction Programs: An Evaluation in New York City," Anthony L. Sciarabba presents findings from a yearlong evaluation of a Department of Justice, Community Capacity Development Office, community-based "Weed and Seed" program operating in a mostly minority community in New York City. The evaluation found substantial levels of community dissatisfaction with the crime situation in the neighborhood and overall dissatisfaction with the official law enforcement agencies operating in the neighborhood. Sciarabba concludes that the current state of the community oriented policing program in New York City influenced these findings.

Kevin I. Minor, Cherie Dawson-Edwards, James B. Wells, Carl Griffith, and Earl Angel discuss correctional staff turnover in their article "Understanding Staff Perceptions of Turnover in Corrections." According to the authors, correctional staff turnover is a critically important but under-researched topic, and studies of how staff perceive the problem are lacking. By using a descriptive survey method, this study examined such perceptions of turnover among a sample of correctional officers. Staff attributed turnover to insufficient pay and benefits as well as to key areas of the work environment, including interpersonal conflicts, stress, unfavorable treatment and lack of recognition from superiors, and perceived lack of input.

T. Jacob Stull, in his article "Trust in Police Officer-Sergeant Relationships," discusses the importance of trust and contends that trust ranks as the most important characteristic of effective supervisor-subordinate relationships. He claims that trust is even more important in military and paramilitary organizations, specifically police departments. The study measures the perceived trust between police officers and sergeants in a western police department. The study measured five components of trust: integrity, competence, consistency, loyalty, and openness.

Editor's Notes

The final article was not peer-reviewed. It is the second of a two-part article by Ken Kerle where he discusses his career as editor of *American Jails*. The first part of the article appeared in the Spring 2009 issue of *PICJ*. In March 2009, Ken Kerle, the founding editor of *American Jails* magazine retired. Many professionals in criminal justice will miss him. Ken has visited more jails than any other known person. He worked hard not only to improve our jails but also to advance the cause of the many professionals employed in our correctional system.

Cliff Roberson, LLM, PhD
Editor-in-Chief, *PICJ*

Contributing Authors

Volume 4 Number 2, Summer 2009

Earl Angel

Eastern Kentucky University

Cherie Dawson-Edwards

Eastern Kentucky University

Carl Griffith

Eastern Kentucky University

James E. Guffey

National University

Chandrika Kelso

National University

Ken Kerle

American Jails Magazine

James G. Larson

National University

Kevin I. Minor

Eastern Kentucky University

Anthony L. Sciarabba

AccuData: Criminal Justice Consultancy

T. Jacob Stull

Aurora (CO) Police Department, Community College of Aurora

James B. Wells

Eastern Kentucky University

Three-Strikes Laws and Police Officer Murders: Do the Data Indicate a Correlation?¹

James E. Guffey, James G. Larson, Chandrika Kelso

Twenty-four states passed three-strikes laws between December 1993 and January 1996. The intent of these laws is to ensure that felons who are convicted of second or third felonies or violent felonies serve long or even life-in-prison terms. These laws fall under mandatory sentencing guidelines, which do not give judges discretion to modify the sentences as they may with non-mandatory sentencing. One untoward result of three-strikes laws is the possibility that police officer murders will increase because felons facing a third strike might decide to use deadly force rather than possibly return to prison for life. This study analyzes the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) *Law Enforcement Officers Killed or Assaulted* data for the period 1987 through 2007 to determine whether a correlation exists.

Key Words: three-strikes legislation • police officer murders • correlation

The three-strikes laws have been in effect in 24 states and the federal government since their passage between December 1993 and January 1996. Three-strikes laws rank among the top in controversial laws passed in the 20th century and have been attacked and vilified by criminal justice pundits from their inception. Among the evils the pundits predicted the laws would produce are: (1) immediate overcrowding of prisons with taxpayers asked to pay for additional prisons, (2) clogging of courts as defendants charged with a second or third strike demand court trials, (3) increase in homicides overall in the U.S. because three strikers would murder to silence victims and witnesses, and (4) more assaults and murders of police officers as three strikers attempt to avoid apprehension.

This research paper focuses on (4) above—the contention that police officer murders would increase significantly—and addresses the following research questions. Do three-strikes laws result in more second- and third-strike offenders resorting to assault and murder of police officers to avoid capture and almost certain life in prison? Is there a statistical correlation between three-strikes laws and the murder of police officers? If a

James E. Guffey is assistant professor of criminal justice administration and regional lead faculty, Department of Professional Studies, National University, Sacramento. James G. Larson is an associate professor and program lead faculty of criminal justice administration, Department of Professional Studies, National University, La Jolla. Chandrika Kelso is associate professor and chair of the Department of Professional Studies, National University, La Jolla.

statistical correlation exists, does this provide a substantive argument in favor of the repeal of three-strikes legislation?

The authors undertook this study to obtain results to compare with the results of previous studies. The 24 states that passed three-strikes legislation did so between December 1993 and January 1, 1996. Moody, Marvell, and Kaminski (2002) examined Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) panel data² for the period 1973 to 1998. Since their study, nine more years (1999–2007) of panel data has been compiled since the passage of the three-strikes laws. Johnson and Saint-Germain (2005) limited their study to the effects of California's three-strikes law. Therefore, the authors of this paper expand on both of these studies by examining UCR panel data from 1987 through 2007 and including all 24 three-strikes states. The period 1987 through 2007 provides a more balanced time series design because it offers nine years of data before the passage of three-strikes laws in 24 states and 11 years of data after the passage of three-strikes laws in 24 states. Moody et al.'s study examines only three years of data after the passage of three-strikes laws in all 24 states (1996–1998). In addition, the authors examine UCR panel data for the 26 non-three-strikes states, which serve as a 26-state control group with which to compare the results of the 24-state three-strikes experimental group. A more detailed explanation of the specific methodology the authors used appears in the Methods section of this paper.

The importance of this study lies in the fact that further research is necessary to examine the effects of three-strikes laws in the 24 states that have adopted it. Politicians often do not look at the long-term effect of laws they pass with the exception of the fiscal impact. Politicians are supposed to implement the policies they champion during their campaigns. Stricter laws aimed at fighting crime are often among the promises. However, "collateral damage" such as increased workloads on law enforcement, the courts, and corrections are often overlooked due to time constraints, lack of staff to delve into the unintended consequences of tough crime legislation, and the influence of special interest groups and lobbyists who tell them only one side of the story. Another of the potential collateral damages, according to pundits who attack three-strikes laws, is the increased danger to law enforcement personnel.

The primary limitation of this study is the inability of the researchers to control for possible rival causal factors. The authors examine the UCR panel data for police officer murders by state for the period 1987 through 2007. By using simple regression analysis, the authors look for statistically significant increases in police officer murders after the passage of the three-strikes laws. Significant findings are assumed to be due to three-strikes legislation; however, other factors could cause a spike in police murders such as poor training that makes the officer more vulnerable, more handguns or lethal weapons in the hands of dangerous parolees, or increased violence in general due to social factors.

Nevertheless, these other factors were extant before and after the passage of the three-strikes laws so the only variant in effect during the period December 1993 through January 1996 is the passage of three-strikes laws in 24 states.

The null hypothesis for this study is there is a positive correlation between the passage of three-strikes laws in 24 states and the number of police officer murders in those states. In other words, parolees who have two prior convictions for felony crimes and who may face life in prison if captured will resort to murdering a police officer to avoid capture; whereas, they may not do so if there was no three-strikes law.

Literature Review

Three-strikes Laws

Three-strikes laws have been very controversial since their passage between December 1993 and January 1996 with the majority of the literature criticizing these laws as too harsh or unnecessary because of habitual offender laws already in place (MacKenzie & Clear, 2002; Wood, 2001; Zimring, Hawkins, & Kamin, 2001).

The first three-strikes law took effect in December 1993 in Washington state by voter initiative. Washington's law was very straightforward; it mandated life terms of imprisonment without possibility for parole for individuals convicted a third time for specified violent offenses (Kovandzic, Sloan, & Vieraitis, 2002). Its law was attributed to the outrage by Washington citizens of the murder of Diane Ballasiotes. In October 1988, Diane Ballasiotes was murdered by Gene Kane, Jr., an escapee from a Seattle work-release facility. Kane brutally stabbed Ballasiotes to death in the course of an attempted rape, robbery, and kidnapping. Similar outrage stemming from the murders of Kim Reynolds and Polly Klaas led to passage of the three-strikes law in California in 1994. Eighteen-year-old Kimberly Reynolds was murdered in June 1992 in Yosemite National Park by two repeat felons with long arrest records. On October 1, 1993, 12-year-old Polly Klaas was abducted from her home in Petaluma, California, by another repeat felon, Richard Allen Davis. That same evening Davis strangled Polly to death and was charged with murder, kidnapping, and attempted sexual molestation. Kim Reynolds' father, Mike Reynolds, spearheaded the initiative that voters passed overwhelmingly even after the California legislature had already passed three-strikes legislation. The initiative insured that the legislation, as written, could not be amended.

Over the next year and a half, 22 more states and the federal government passed their own versions of three strikes. Kovandzic et al. (2002) offer the following comments on three-strikes laws:

Analyses of the content of these laws by Turner, Sundt, Applegate, and Cullen (1995) and Austin and Irwin (2001) reveal [the following similarities and differences]. First, almost all the states include serious violent offenses (e.g., murder, rape, robbery, and serious assault) as strikeable. Other states include drug-related crimes (Indiana, Louisiana, California); burglary (California); firearm violations (California); escape (Florida); treason (Washington); and embezzlement and bribery (South Carolina). Second, there is variation in the number of strikes needed for an offender to be out. In eight states, two strikes bring a significant sentence enhancement. Third, states differ in the term of incarceration imposed on offenders who strike out (Kovandzic et al., 2002, p. 209).

Three Strikes and Police Officer Murders

Moody et al. (2002) analyzed the relationship between three-strikes laws and police officer murders. They used UCR data for police officers killed in the line of duty from 1973 through 1998. Their dependent variable was the number of law enforcement officers feloniously killed in the line of duty, and their target variable was a dummy variable that took the unit value in years following the passage of the three-strikes law. They also employed a number of control variables. By using the Poisson model, they determined that police murders increased in three-strikes states compared with other states.

[B]ecause there are very few police murders in relation to the number of arrests, the three-strikes laws can have a large impact on the number of police murders even if they prompt only a minuscule proportion of criminals to take evasive action by killing arresting officers. There are no *a priori* theoretical or empirical reasons for determining whether that minuscule proportion exists. Our research indicates that it does exist. Using state-level data from 1973 to 1998, we estimate Poisson and negative binomial fixed-effects models to determine the impact of the 24 three-strikes laws on murders of police [officers]. We find an estimated impact of 44% more murders in the years following the laws. In the average state there were 1.2 police murders per year in the 1990s; so the typical three-strikes law leads to an additional police murder [in each three-strike state] roughly every other year (Moody et al., 2002, pp. 18–19).

Other researchers have examined the possibility of increased police officer murders after the passage of three-strikes laws. By using a simple one-group, pre-test, post-test study, Stedman (1997) found a 14% increase in the number of California police officers

murdered after passage of the law. Stedman also found that six of the 20 police killers apprehended since the law already had two strikes, whereas no police killers in the three years before the law had two strikes.

Stedman (1997) and Austin et al. (1999) interviewed prisoners and gave examples of prisoners' claims that they might be more likely to kill officers because of the laws. In a study of homicide in general and its possible relation to three-strikes laws, Marvell and Moody (2001) argue that three-strikes laws increase overall homicide rates substantially. Their reasoning is that criminals, fearing three-strike penalties, will murder witnesses and others, including police officers, in a desperate attempt to escape detection and capture. "Everything else being the same, when the penalties for a crime and for an exacerbated version of that crime are similar, the criminal can be expected to commit the exacerbated version if that reduces the chances of apprehension and conviction" (2001, p. 92).

Kovandzic et al. (2002) support Marvel and Moody's (2001) finding in their study of 188 large cities during the period 1980 through 1999. Their study compares homicide rates in 110 cities in states with three-strikes legislation with homicide cases in 78 cities in states without three-strikes laws. They also use seven control variables that have shown to be correlates of homicide: percentage of African-American persons, percentage of population ages 18 through 24, percentage of female-headed households, percentage of population living below the poverty line, per-capita income, percentage of population living alone, and prison population. These variables are derived from the commonly accepted criminological theories of strain/deprivation, social disorganization, and opportunity/routine activities (p. 405).

Kovandzic et al. acknowledge simultaneity bias in their study. They define simultaneity bias as the possibility that legislatures in the three-strikes states passed the laws because the homicide rates were already increasing and continued to increase after the passage of the laws for the period of their study. They rely on the Granger causality test, which Marvell and Moody (2001) used in their study to dismiss this possibility, however.

In their conclusion, despite the possibility of simultaneity bias, Kovandzic et al. assert that in cities with three-strikes laws, homicide rates increased on average 13% to 14% in the short-term and 16% to 24% in the long-term compared with cities without the laws. Based on this they conclude, "The present findings lend further support to existing theoretical and empirical research demonstrating disutility and potentially lethal danger of three-strikes laws" (2002, p. 418).

Jeffrey L. Johnson and Michelle A. Saint-Germain (2005) examined the effect of California's 1994 three-strikes law on front-line law enforcement personnel, focusing on whether they face a greater risk of injury by criminal suspects resisting arrest and contact with law enforcement due to three strikes. Specifically, Johnson and Saint-Germain collected and evaluated data from six major police agencies and district attorney offices in

California between 1990 and 2001. The data included total arrests, resisting arrest charges, assault on a peace officer, officer injuries or deaths, use of force incidents, officer-involved shootings, vehicle pursuits, and three-strikes case filings (2005, p. 443).

Johnson and Saint-Germain used a comparative, longitudinal research design. They analyzed data before the passage of three-strikes in 1994 and afterward up until 2001 from California's six largest cities (Los Angeles, San Francisco, San Diego, Long Beach, Oakland, and San Jose). They selected Phoenix, Arizona, as a control city because Arizona does not have a three-strikes law. Data were obtained from three sources: a questionnaire, the Office of the District Attorney of the county of Los Angeles, and the California Department of Corrections (2005, p. 445).

The following is Johnson and Saint-Germain's summary of their findings in the category of "Violence Toward Police":

1. There were few changes after three strikes in the number of arrests involving a charge of resisting arrest and obstructing an officer.
2. There were few dramatic effects for assaults on a police officer. Los Angeles had a mixed (nonsignificant) pattern before 1994; afterwards, there was a slight, lagged increase beginning in 1996 but then a decline after 1997 into a significant downward trend. Only Oakland showed a different pattern with a significant increase in the number of assaults on police officers after 1994.
3. Injuries to police in the sample cities did not appear to increase markedly after three strikes. . . . However, the Los Angeles trend did change from a long-term, significant decline to a more mixed . . . trend. Injuries to San Diego officers significantly increased after 1994; whereas in Long Beach [they] significantly declined.
4. There was no clear pattern in the number of instances in which police had to use force in making an arrest, although complete data were available from only three of the survey cities.
5. The number of officer-involved shootings likewise declined or remained relatively flat in nearly all the survey cities after . . . three strikes. [Of note, control City] Phoenix was the only city to have a statistically significant increase.
6. The number of vehicle pursuits initiated by police officers in completing arrests did not show much effect from the implementation of three strikes . . . (2005, pp. 447–449).

Johnson and Saint-Germain make the following conclusions:

First, there has not been a pervasive, statewide impact on violence or injuries to police officers because of three strikes. If we examine the numbers of suspects who (both before and after three strikes) are resisting, obstructing, assaulting, injuring, or even killing police officers, we do not discern a consistent statewide increase or trend. Even if we allow for (generalized) diminishing arrest figures since three strikes was introduced, we still do not find a smoking gun (2005, p. 454).

A review of the literature reveals that the issue of police officer murders and three-strikes legislation is not clear. A macro study by Moody et al. (2002) reveals a clear correlation between police officer murders and three-strikes legislation. However, a micro study of assaults and other indicators of increased violence against police officers in California did not uncover the same results. Also, studies of the homicide rates in cities in states that have legislated three-strikes legislation support the contention that homicides do increase in those cities compared with cities in states that have not passed three-strikes legislation. Because the results of these studies are proffered as reasons to repeal three-strikes legislation, it is important that more research is conducted to provide data either in favor of or in opposition to repeal of three-strikes legislation.

Methods

Our study used data from the Uniform Crime Report's *Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted* (LEOKA), Table 1, Law Enforcement Officers Feloniously Killed, Geographic Region, Division, and State for the periods 1987–1997 and 1998–2007. This is a period of 21 years. In addition to the LEOKA data, the authors also used the UCR's data for the total number of civilian homicides for each state for the period 1994 and 1995 through 2007. These data were employed as a control. The literature and logic suggest that homicides of police officers should have a positive correlation with homicides of civilians. If, for example, police officer homicides increased after the passage of three-strikes laws in the 24 three-strikes states, we should expect a similar increase in citizen homicides in the 24 three-strikes states (Johnson & Saint-Germain, 2005; Kovandzic et al., 2002). Therefore, we compare the civilian homicide data in the 24 three-strikes states as well as the 26 non-three-strikes with the peace officer homicide data in both groups for the period 1994 and 1995 through 2007.

Experimental Design

The experimental design comprises two separate designs to make a comparison and determine whether the two separate designs yield similar results and thus substantiate the

validity and reliability of the overall study. Design #1 consists of two interrupted time series designs with the pre-observations from 1987 through 1993 for the 13* states that passed three-strikes states in 1994 and pre-observations from 1987 through 1994 for the 11** states that passed three-strikes states in 1995.

Post-observations are taken from 1995 through 2007 for the 13 1994 three-strikes states and post-observations are taken from 1996 through 2007 for the 11 1995 three-strikes states. The independent variable is the 1994 implementation of three-strikes laws in 13 states and the 1995 implementation of three-strikes laws in 11 states. The dependent variables are the observations of police officer murders from the LEOKA data from 1987 through 2007 in all 24 three-strike states with the year-of-implementation murders (1994 and 1995) counted as pre-implementation counts. This was done to account for the lag time to begin prosecutions and allow for sufficient media coverage to make two- and three-strike felons aware of the new law.

Design #2 is a pre-experimental design that could be labeled an interrupted time series post-test-only control group design. This design compares the number of post-three-strikes officer murders in the 24 three-strike states with the officer murders in the 26 non-three-strikes states for the period 1996–2007 by using the LEOKA date for this period. The “experimental group” comprises the 24 three-strike states, and the “control group” comprises the 26 non-three-strike states. Because the division of three-strikes states and non-three-strikes is almost even, equivalence is obtained to some degree—certainly as close as can be expected without a complete randomization.

The authors compared data and results from Design #1 with the data and results of Design #2 (see Results section) to determine whether the two designs yield similar results. In other words, the authors would expect that, if officer murders show a statistically significant increase in Design #1, i.e., murders increase from pre- to post-three strikes over the 21 years of observations for both the 13 1994 three-strike states and the 11 1995 three-strike states, and Design #2 shows a statistically significant increase post-three strikes in the 24 three-strikes states versus the 26 non-three-strikes states, we can posit that most likely the effect is due to the implementation of three-strikes versus any rival causal factor(s). The authors employed an additional control as well. Previous studies (Kovandzic et al., 2002; Marvell & Moody, 2001) indicate that civilian homicides increase at a statistically significant rate in three-strike states versus non-three-strike states. Therefore, we

*California, Colorado, Connecticut, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, New Mexico, North Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin

**Arkansas, Georgia, Indiana, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Utah, and Vermont

compared the total number of civilian homicides in the three-strike states and the non-three-strike states with police homicides in Design #2 for the period 1994 through 2007 to determine whether police officer homicides correlate with civilian homicides either positively or negatively in the 24 three-strike states.

Statistical Methods

The data were entered in SPSS by using Coefficient of Correlation (Pearson's *r*) as the methods of analysis. In addition, line charts were generated by using the Chart feature in SPSS. This was done to see the trend in police homicides to compare with the SPSS regression data. The following tables and line charts display and define the data.


Table 1. *Pearson's Correlation, 13 States That Passed Three-Strikes Laws in 1994, Interrupted Times Series Design*

Independent Variable—States Enacting Three-Strikes Laws in 1994			
Year	<i>r</i>	<i>N</i>	Significance
1987	.631	13	.021*
1988	.650	13	.016*
1989	.521	13	.068
1990	.529	13	.063
1991	.325	13	.278
1992	.434	13	.138
1993	.572	13	.041*
1994—Year First 13 States Enacted Three-Strikes Laws			
1995	.592	13	.033*
1996	.345	13	.294
1997	.439	13	.134
1998	.900	13	.000**
1999	.592	13	.033*
2000	-.198	13	.537
2001	.530	13	.062
2002	.468	13	.106
2003	.718	13	.006**
2004	.169	13	.580
2005	.694	13	.009**
2006	.772	13	.002**
2007	.131	13	.670

* $p \leq .05$ ** $p \leq .01$

In this time series design, if there was a significant increase in police officer murders after the implementation of three-strikes laws, we would expect low/insignificant correlation with the 1994 implementation year before 1994 and a steady increase in correlation/significance after 1994. The Pearson correlation data (Table 1) partially support this hypothesis; however, the correlations are uneven. The years 1987, 1988, and 1993 reveal a $p \leq .05$. Post-1994, the years 1995, 1998, 1999, 2003, 2005, and 2006 reveal a $p \leq .05$ with more correlations at the $p \leq .01$ level. Therefore, the data do indicate a sporadic/intermittent increase post-1994. There could be several explanations for this. First, it may be that prosecutions for three-strikes offenses are cyclical, and increased violence against officers occurred in those years when prosecutions were higher. Second, it may be that three strikes has a minimal effect, and the increase in police homicides is due to other factors that are traditionally attributed to increased police homicides in addition to three-strikes legislation.

Figure 1. *Average Yearly Police Homicides from 1987 through 2007 for the First 13 States to Pass Three-Strikes Laws (1994)*



Note. In 1994, 13 states implemented three-strikes laws.

Figure 1 depicts the line graph for the average yearly police homicides from 1987 through 2007 for the 13 states that enacted three-strikes laws in 1994. A vertical line at the year

1994 distinguishes when three strikes took effect in these states. Figure 1 also shows the uneven/cyclical trend of police homicides after the passage of three strikes. It also shows that police officer homicides were actually increasing before the passage of three strikes.

Table 2 depicts data for the 11 states that enacted three-strikes laws in 1995. None of the years before 1995 show a correlation at the $p = <.05$ level, and only two post-1995 years show a correlation at the $p = <.05$ level—1997 and 2006. Clearly the data for the 11 1995 three-strikes states show no significant trend in increased police homicides.


Table 2. *Pearson's Correlation, 11 States That Passed Three-Strikes Laws in 1995, Interrupted Time Series Design*

Independent Variable—1995 Three-Strikes States			
Year	<i>r</i>	<i>N</i>	Significance
1987	.272	11	.418
1988	.330	11	.322
1989	.187	11	.582
1990	.134	11	.694
1991	.385	11	.243
1992	.126	11	.713
1993	.280	11	.404
1994	.204	11	.548
1995—Year Last 11 States Enacted Three-Strikes Laws			
1996	.285	11	.395
1997	.646	11	.032*
1998	.326	11	.328
1999	.335	11	.314
2000	.185	11	.586
2001	.215	11	.526
2002	-.159	11	.641
2003	-.197	11	.562
2004	.252	11	.455
2005	.263	11	.435
2006	.698	11	.017*
2007	.274	11	.414

* $p \leq .05$

Figure 2 shows the average yearly police homicides from 1987 through 2007 in the 11 states that enacted three-strikes laws in 1995 with a vertical line depicting 1995. Once again the data closely follow the Pearson data. The graph shows a gradual downturn in homicides after 1995 with a couple of small spikes. This is a much different outcome from the data for the 13 1994 three-strikes states. It clearly indicates no correlation between the passage of three-strikes in these 11 states and homicides of police officers.

Figure 2. *Average Yearly Police Homicides from 1987 through 2007 for the Last 11 States to Pass Three-Strikes Laws (1995)*



Note. The remaining 11 states passed three-strikes laws in 1995.

Tables 3 and 4 display the data for experimental Design #2—the interrupted time series post-test-only design. Table 3 contains the data for the combined 24 three-strikes states from 1996 through 2007, representing the experimental group. Table 4 shows the data for the 26 non-three-strikes states from 1996 through 2007, representing the control group. In addition, both tables include the variance from the mean of the base year of 1996 for each of the

years 1997 through 2007 for *civilian homicides* to compare with police homicides for these years to determine whether the trend is similar for each. Previous research by Kovandzic et al. (2002) asserted that police homicides will increase along with an increase in civilian homicides. Therefore, we made this comparison in our study as a control. If both vary in the same direction, this is additional assurance that a similar causative factor affected the police homicides changes—the three-strikes laws.

Table 3—Pearson's Correlation for the 24 Three-Strikes States, 1996–2007

Year	Pearson's Correlation 24 Three-Strikes States, 1996–2007			Mean Variance Civilian Homicides, 1997–2007
	<i>r</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>Sig</i>	
		1996		462.33
1997	.331	24	.115	-33.29
1998	.482	24	.017*	-62.08
1999	.365	24	.079	-103.29
2000	.473	24	.020*	-98.17
2001	.295	24	.161	-93.92
2002	.522	24	.009**	-77.92
2003	.307	24	.145	-67.33
2004	.788	24	.000**	-72.96
2005	.588	24	.003**	-59.25
2006	.493	24	.014*	-48.96
2007	.643	24	.001**	-49.75

* $p \leq .05$ ** $p \leq .01$

The Pearson's data for both the 24 three-strikes states and the 26 non-three-strike states show significant correlations with the 1996 data. The data correlate significantly with the base year of 1996 for both the experimental (24 three-strikes states) and the control (26 non-three-strikes states) groups. Therefore, we can say the three-strikes law has had no effect on police homicides; they vary in the same direction for both the control and experimental groups. Figures 3 and 4 represent line graphs for the data in Tables 3 and 4, respectively. The line graphs show that police homicides for the period 1996–2007 are cyclical for both the three-strikes states and the non-three-strikes states, and there is no change in homicides from 1996 through 2007. Moreover, the civilian homicides for both the three-strikes states and the non-three-strikes states show significant decreases during this same period. This is significant because the trend is the same for police homicides and civilian homicides during this period: police homicides in both groups move laterally; civilian homicides in both groups move downward.

Table 4—Pearson's Correlation for the 26 Non-Three-Strikes States, 1996–2007


Year	Pearson's Correlation 26 Non-Three-Strikes States, 1996–2007			Mean Variance Civilian Homicides, 1997–2007
	<i>r</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>Sig</i>	
1996				313.53
1997	.547	26	.004**	-20.8
1998	.546	26	.004**	-42.46
1999	.321	26	.110	-56.80
2000	.524	26	.006**	-62.07
2001	.399	26	.044*	-47.92
2002	.738	26	.000**	-53.30
2003	.525	26	.006**	-53.00
2004	.555	26	.003**	-59.92
2005	.367	26	.065	-51.11
2006	.705	26	.000**	-46.46
2007	.591	26	.001**	-50.23

p* ≥ .05 *p* ≤ .01

Figure 3. Average Yearly Police Homicides, 1996 through 2007 for 24 Three-strikes States



Figure 4. Average Yearly Police Homicides, 1996 through 2007, 26 Non-Three-Strikes States



Results

In the introduction, the authors identified three research questions:

1. Do three-strikes laws result in more second- and third-strike offenders resorting to assault and murder of police officers to avoid capture and almost certain life in prison?

The data indicate that there is no clear trend in police homicides for the 24 three-strike states since the passage of the three-strikes laws in these states up to 2007. Also, when compared with police homicides before the passage of the three-strikes laws, the data indicate that the number of police homicides remained unchanged after the passage of the three-strikes laws in the 24 states from the period 1987 through 2007. In addition, the authors found that civilian homicides have shown a significant decrease in both the 24 three-strike states as well as the 26 non-three-strike states.

2. Is there a statistical correlation between three-strikes laws and the murder of police officers?

There is no clear statistical correlation between three-strikes laws and the murder of police officers. If there was a correlation, the data would show a steady increase in police

officer homicides or at least a significant increase between the dates of passage and the most current 2007 data. This is not the case.

3. If a statistical correlation exists, does this provide a substantial argument in favor of repeal of three-strikes laws in the 24 states that have passed them?

Because there is no significant statistical correlation, the authors believe that arguments in favor of the repeal of three strikes because they increase police officer murders are unfounded. In fact, arguments in favor of the repeal of three strikes because three strikes increases murders in these states are also unfounded. The 11-year data since 1996 indicate that civilian murders have shown a significant decrease in the 24 three-strikes states.

Conclusions

Three-strikes laws have been vilified since their passage in 24 states between December 1993 and January 1995. Studies by Kovandzic et al. (2002) and Marvell and Moody (2001) assert that three-strikes laws have increased both police officer and civilian murders in the 24 three-strike states. However, these studies were limited in their scope. They looked at data for only three years or fewer after the passage of three-strikes laws. This limited scope of data precipitated the study by the current authors to look at the data up to the most current data published by the FBI in the UCR—2007. With this more expanded time series design, the authors found that the percentage increase asserted by Moody et al. (2002) of 44% is not supported. Moreover, the civilian murder increases of 16% to 24% propounded by Kovandzic et al. (2002) is also not supported with use of our expanded data.

It is the authors' conclusion that three-strikes laws do not increase police officer murders and, by extension, assaults. The same appears to be true for civilian homicides. There may be other arguments in favor of the repeal of three-strikes laws; for example, it can be argued that mandatory sentencing and habitual offender laws serve the same purpose—to incapacitate offenders, if not for life, for most of their lives.

Even though three-strikes laws do not increase police officer homicides, officers can be more vulnerable when confronting convicted felons. Training to identify convicted felons could certainly reduce the number of assaults on police officers. Technology could be an asset for this purpose. The authors envision a microchip that could be implanted in the arm of paroled felons that contains their arrest and conviction history. Officers could carry a sensor on their duty belts that could sound an audible beep and display on a dashboard computer the arrest and conviction history of the felon. With training and technology, officers can be made safer while on patrol.

Notes

1. The authors presented this paper at the 46th Annual Meeting of the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences, March 10–14, 2009, Boston, Massachusetts.
2. All references to UCR panel data refer specifically to *Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted* (LEOKA) data.

References

- Austin, J., Clark, J., Hardyman, P., & Henry, D. A. (1999). *Three strikes and you're out: The implementation and impact of strike laws*. Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice-U.S. Department of Justice. [NCJ #181297]
- Austin, J., & Irwin, J. (2001). *It's about time: America's imprisonment binge* (3rd ed.). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
- Johnson, J. L., & Saint-Germain, M. A. (2005). Officer down: Implications of three-strikes for public safety. *Criminal Justice Policy Review*, 16, 443–460. Retrieved October 20, 2008, from EBSCO Host database.
- Kovandzic, T. V., Sloan, J. J., III, & Vieraitis, L. M. (2002, July). Unintended consequences of politically popular sentencing policy: The homicide promoting effects of "three strikes" in U.S. cities (1980–1999). *Criminology and Public Policy*, 1(3), 399–424. Retrieved October 28, 2008, from EBSCO Host database.
- LaFree, G. (2002, Fall). Too much democracy or too much crime? Lessons from California's three strikes law. *Law and Social Inquiry*, 27(4), 875–902. Retrieved October 29, 2008, from EBSCO Host database.
- Lockyer v. Andrade*: California three strikes law survives challenge base on federal law that is anything but "clearly established." *The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*, 94(3), 687–692. Retrieved October 29, 2008, from EBSCO Host database.
- Mackenzie, D. L., & Clear, T. R. (2002, July). Three strikes. *Criminology and Public Policy*, 1(3), 351–352.
- Marvell, T. B., & Moody, C. E. (2001, January). The lethal effects of three-strikes laws. *Journal of Legal Studies*, 30(1), 89–106.
- Moody, C. E., Marvell, T. B., & Kaminski, R. J. (2002, January 11). *Unintended consequences: Three-strikes laws and the murder of police officers*. Rockville, MD: National Institute of Justice/National Criminal Justice Reference Service. [NCJRS # 203649]

Guffey, Larson, and Kelso

- Rueben, R. (1995, January). Get-tough stance draws fiscal criticism. *American Bar Association Journal*, 81, 16–17. Retrieved November 2, 2008, from EBSCO Host database.
- Savage, D. G. (2002, November). Were '90s laws too tough? *American Bar Association Journal*, 9, 22–24. Retrieved October 29, 2008, from EBSCO Host database.
- Schiraldi, V., Colburn, J., & Lotke, E. (2002). *Three strikes and you're out: An examination of the impact of 3-strikes laws 10 years after their enactment* [policy brief]. Washington, DC: Justice Policy Institute. Retrieved November 2, 2008, from http://www.soros.org/initiatives/usprograms/focus/justice/articles_publications/publications/threestrikes_20040923/three_strikes.pdf
- Stedman, M. J. (1997). *What will be the impact of the "three strikes" law on violence towards California peace officers in 5 years?* Sacramento, CA: Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training.
- Turner, M. G., Sundt, J. L., Applegate, B. K., & Cullen, F. T. (1995). Three strikes and you're out legislation: A national assessment. *Federal Probation*, 59, 16–36.
- U.S. Department of Justice. (1996). *Uniform crime reports, Law enforcement officers killed and assaulted*. Retrieved November 10, 2008, from <http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/killed/96killed.pdf>
- U.S. Department of Justice. (2006). Law enforcement officers feloniously killed [Table 1, 1997–2006]. In *Uniform crime reports, Law enforcement officers killed and assaulted*. Retrieved November 10, 2008, from <http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/killed/2006/table1.html>
- U.S. Department of Justice. (2007). Law enforcement officers feloniously killed [Table 1, 2007]. In *Uniform crime reports, Law enforcement officers killed and assaulted*. Retrieved November 10, 2008, from http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/killed/2007/data/table_01.html
- Wood, D. B. (2001, November 8). "Three strikes" law: Is it too-cruel punishment? *The Christian Science Monitor*, 93(242), 1–2.
- Zimring, F. E., Hawkins, G., & Kamin, S. (2001). *Punishment and democracy: Three strikes and you're out in California*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Community Oriented Policing and Community-Based Crime Reduction Programs: An Evaluation in New York City¹

Anthony L. Sciarabba

This article presents findings from a yearlong evaluation of a Department of Justice, Community Capacity Development Office, community-based “Weed and Seed” program operating in an urban, mostly minority community in New York City. The program operates on the central premise of first using law enforcement and prosecutorial resources to “weed” out the criminal elements in the neighborhood and, second, establishing positive community-based programs in the specified target areas by way of “seeding” activities. Findings following the yearlong evaluation, which used community survey data in addition to official crime statistics, indicate substantial levels of community dissatisfaction with the crime situation in the neighborhood. Additionally, findings indicate overall dissatisfaction with the official agencies operating in the neighborhood. The author attributes these findings to the current community oriented policing policies in New York City and, in his discussion of the findings’ implications, asserts the need for integrating theory with criminal justice community-based policy.

Key Words: policy • neighborhood crime • criminological theory • integration

One major avenue in crime reduction policy is the development of community-based initiatives. One such endeavor, the Weed and Seed strategy, is a community-based program designed to enhance neighborhood-level crime control initiatives while simultaneously restoring the positive elements of community that neighborhood crime reduced. Maintained by the Community Capacity Development Office of the United States Department of Justice, the Weed and Seed policy has, as its name implies, two components: “weeding” and “seeding.” The weeding component entails the efforts of law enforcement in fighting crime and criminality in the specified neighborhood or target area. Such efforts include increasing the activities of law enforcement by providing additional funding for officer overtime and various law enforcement outreach initiatives. The expectation is that such law enforcement activities will promote greater cooperation between members of the community and the criminal justice agencies operating within the immediate neighborhood.

Anthony L. Sciarabba is the director and principal consultant for AccuData: Criminal Justice Consultancy. In addition to his field research activities evaluating neighborhood-level crime reduction policies for the U.S. Department of Justice, he has published widely and serves as the associate managing editor of *Police Practice and Research: An International Journal*.

Professional Issues in Criminal Justice Vol 4(2), 2009 27

In addition to the primary policing agency operating in the neighborhood, other law enforcement agencies, including the federal Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), are often incorporated into the overall law enforcement role as a result of this increased cooperation among criminal justice agencies. Such interagency cooperation arises from the increasingly complicated criminal activity such as transnational drug and weapons activity. Another component of the law enforcement strategy is the work and activities of the local district attorney's office in prosecuting those arrested as a result of neighborhood "weeding." The success of the law enforcement segment of any Weed and Seed strategy hinges on the level of cooperation between police and prosecutors. In short, it is their collective responsibility that negative elements operating within the specified Weed and Seed target area are removed or suppressed by way of arrests and deterrence and prosecuted and sanctioned.

The second component of the Weed and Seed strategy involves establishing and enhancing community and social initiatives. This "seeding" segment includes beautification and restoration activities and development strategies designed to repair aspects of the community that have been neglected and weakened as a result of the criminal elements operating in the community before implementation of the Weed and Seed strategy. An example of this activity is establishment of a community youth center in an area formerly plagued by gang violence. Therefore, the goal of the seeding component or, more accurately, the prevention, intervention, and treatment and neighborhood restoration subcommittees is research, development, and implementation of programs that restore the positive aspects of the community.

Congruence of the "weeding" and "seeding" components is essential, but it depends on the effectiveness of the community oriented policing taking place in the targeted neighborhood. Community oriented policing is, according to the Department of Justice, the lynchpin of the Weed and Seed strategy in that it is responsible for joining the activities of law enforcement and prosecutorial efforts with those of prevention, intervention, treatment, and restoration. Thus, the success of an entire Weed and Seed strategy depends on the success of the community oriented policing strategy in place in the neighborhood.

The current research presents findings from a yearlong evaluation of a Weed and Seed program operating in a mostly minority community in metropolitan New York City. Initiated in November 2007 and concluded in October 2008, the purpose of the evaluation was to measure program effectiveness of the Weed and Seed strategy. As noted, a primary component of any Weed and Seed strategy is the contribution of community oriented policing initiatives. Research assessing the impact and effectiveness of community oriented policing as a strategic component of a major neighborhood-level

community crime reduction program, such as Weed and Seed, is warranted as such research can better influence criminal justice policy. As the author will argue, some insight as to the effectiveness of a community oriented policing strategy can be ascertained by examining the success of its policies. The current research discusses the effectiveness of the community oriented policing strategy of the New York City Police Department (NYPD) in light of the agency's participation and activities in the Weed and Seed strategy operating in New York City. It seeks to answer the question of whether a criminal justice policy that depends on a strong community oriented policing program can be effective if community oriented policing is weak or replaced entirely with another, more aggressive, form of policing.

Community Oriented Policing and the Weed and Seed Strategy

Law enforcement agencies operating within a designated Weed and Seed area are incorporated into the overall program strategy. This incorporation occurs in two distinct ways. First, local, and in some cases, regional, and federal law enforcement agencies strive to remove the criminal element from the targeted neighborhood, thus reducing the crime rate as well as reducing the levels of fear of crime among community residents. The second incorporation of law enforcement occurs through the practice of community oriented policing. As noted, in any Weed and Seed strategy, community oriented policing is essentially the bridge joining the "weeding" segment with the "seeding" segment. According to the Community Capacity Development Office (CCDO), which provides national oversight of the Weed and Seed strategy, "community policing embraces two key concepts—community engagement and problem solving. Community policing strategies foster a sense of responsibility within the community for solving crime problems and help develop cooperative relationships between the police and residents" (U.S. Department of Justice CCDO, n.d., ¶ 6) Therefore, the elements of a successful community oriented policing strategy, according to the Department of Justice, include the community's overall satisfaction with local law enforcement. Additionally, and in the broader sense, the elements of overall successful law enforcement participation in the Weed and Seed strategy would include a decrease in the neighborhood crime rates and reduced fear of crime levels among community residents.

While this compartmentalized organization of the Weed and Seed strategy seems simple, the reality is more complex as the success of any Weed and Seed strategy depends essentially on the success of the much debated idea of community oriented policing.

The Community Oriented Policing Paradigm in New York City

Research focusing on community oriented policing is in no short supply. Conversely, research assessing the impact and effectiveness of community oriented policing as a strategic component of a major neighborhood-level community crime reduction program, such as Weed and Seed, is limited in the scientific literature.

Community oriented policing, as defined by Skolnick (1999), “is the actualization of the concept that in a democracy, the police are not supposed to be insular, self-contained, or cut off from the communities from which their power derives” (quoted in Walsh & Vito, 2004, p. 55). In the community oriented policing paradigm, the police form working bonds with community residents with the expectation that relating to the community more effectively promotes more effective methods of fighting crime. As each community possesses its own unique characteristics, individualized relationships with the police offer the potential to develop more “custom” approaches in the fight against neighborhood crime, taking into account these community-level differences. Kelling and Coles (1996) assert that as “problems are most often local—requiring identification and crafting of responses at this level—authority must be devolved to lower levels of the police organization if a department is to be responsive to neighborhood needs” (p. 160).

Concerning police tactics, “community policing eschews *general tactics*, like preventive patrol and rapid response to calls for service, in favor of *specific tactics*, targeted on particular problems and developed in collaboration with citizens and city, governmental, and private sector agencies” (Kelling & Coles 1996, p. 159, emphasis in source). These specific tactics also encompass more traditional law enforcement, including “strategies that repress crime, fear, and disorder within neighborhoods” (Fyfe, Greene, Walsh, Wilson, & McLaren, 1997, as quoted in Walsh & Vito, 2004, p. 55). Thus, the effectiveness of community oriented policing requires a congruent level of cooperation between the police and the community. However, what happens when a community oriented policing style shifts to a zero-tolerance policing style?

The NYPD has shifted its approach to crime fighting by moving away from community oriented policing strategies toward a more aggressive approach. Currently, the NYPD practices zero-tolerance policing, embracing its more aggressive and traditional law enforcement ideals and its high priority for quality of life crime enforcement (see Eterno, 2003; Greene, 1999; Kelling & Coles, 1996). Additionally, the Compstat program of the NYPD (see Eterno & Silverman, 2006; Silverman, 1999) has hindered a number of community oriented policing elements the NYPD used before the appointment of former Police Commissioner William Bratton in 1994 by then-Mayor Rudolph Giuliani. Such an erosion of these elements acts as a detrimental force against police-community relations.

This erosion was especially significant in minority neighborhoods. In assessing the effects of Compstat, the managerial product of the zero-tolerance movement of the NYPD, Eterno and Silverman (2006) note that the implementation of the program created a significant divide between police and many of the city's minority residents:

Minority communities were particularly outspoken about police abuse (see e.g., Haberman, 1997). They cited events such as the sexual abuse of a prisoner, Abner Louima, who had a stick placed up his rectum by the officers who had him in custody; the shooting of an unarmed black man, Amadou Diallo, 41 shots by police; and the shooting of another unarmed black man, Patrick Dorismond. These are just a few examples of incidents in which issues between police and minorities became tense. To some, especially those in minority communities, the police were like an army of occupation. During this time, citizens were quoted as stating that people, 'are locked up because of their race or their politics, as in Nazi Germany' (Haberman, p. B1) (p. 222).

A key finding from Eterno and Silverman (2006) was that Compstat is, in fact, a dividing force between minorities and police.

There is additional evidence that zero-tolerance policing in New York City has created a substantial rift between minority community members and the police. The New York City Civilian Complaint Review Board, or CCRB, investigates civilian complaints of alleged misconduct against NYPD officers. Originally established in 1953 by the NYPD, the CCRB today is composed entirely of civilian investigators. Eterno and Silverman (2006) note that CCRB statistics offer evidence that the minority population of New York City has essentially bore the brunt of the aggressive zero-tolerance policing policies employed by the NYPD as the majority of the civilian complaints alleging police abuse are filed by minority residents, mainly African Americans. In the 2001 CCRB annual report, 51% of the alleged victims of police abuse were Black. In 2002, this figure had increased to 52%. In 2003, it remained at 52%. In 2004, the figure increased to 53%. In the 2005 annual report, the figure again increased, this time to 54%. In 2006, this figure increased to 58%, a five-year high. Interestingly, during this period, roughly 25% of the population of New York City was African American. Therefore, there is evidence that African Americans are overrepresented in police abuse allegations in New York City. While this finding can be attributed to a number of causes, prior research indicates that a rift does exist between many minority residents of New York City and the NYPD as a result of zero-tolerance

policing. Thus, these CCRB findings of alleged abuse act as additional evidence that such aggressive policing by the NYPD tends to focus more heavily on the minority community.

The practice of heavily focusing on minority communities by the NYPD is counterproductive in building and strengthening police-community ties as outlined in the community oriented policing doctrine. As such, it can be argued that the success of any type of community-level crime reduction program implemented in a minority neighborhood, whose success depends on the strength of the community oriented policing capabilities of the NYPD, faces significant challenges. The implementation of the more aggressive zero-tolerance policing style in New York City by the NYPD has dealt a serious blow to the original community oriented policing efforts previously in place, and as Greene (1999) asserts, "New York City has turned away from community policing" (p. 186). Other scholars have gone as far as suggesting that community policing was "perhaps a failed paradigm" in general (Kania, 2004, p. 80). This brings the discussion back to the original research question: can criminal justice policy, which in this case depends conceptually on a strong community oriented policing program, be effective if more aggressive, zero-tolerance policing has taken hold?

An Overview of the Weed and Seed Site in New York City

The original evaluation examined a Weed and Seed strategy operating in a metropolitan community of New York City from November 2007 through October 2008. The community is located in southern Queens County, just east of Manhattan. The original Weed and Seed grant allocated \$250,000 in funds annually for two areas: the original target area and the expansion area.

Demographic Analysis—Original Target Area

Within the original target area, the United States Census Bureau identifies two areas as individual census tracts. Of particular interest are census, income, population, and housing data. The first census tract is home to 8,752 residents. Ninety-three percent of these residents are minority (8,142), mainly African American (6,374) and Hispanic (1,466). The census classifies this tract as a low income area in which more than 40% of the tract population live below the poverty line. The second census tract is home to 3,270 residents, more than 99% (99.3%) minority (3,248). Similar to the first track, the majority of the minority population is African American (2,667) and Hispanic (505). The census classifies this tract as a moderate income area in which 23% of the tract population live below the poverty line.

Demographic Analysis—Expansion Target Area

Within the expansion target area, the census identifies two areas as individual census tracts. Additionally, a significant portion of a third census tract is also within the expansion target area. As such, this discussion includes demographics from this third tract.

The first census tract is home to 5,701 residents, nearly 96% (95.7%) of these residents are minority (5,461). Most of the minority population is African American (3,994) and Hispanic (1,117). The census classifies this tract as a moderate income area in which 33% of the tract population live below the poverty line. The second census tract in the expansion target area contains 6,670 residents. Sixty percent (60.7%) of these residents are minority (4,051), with most of the minority population being Hispanic (2,056) and African American (1,753). The census classifies this tract as a moderate income area in which 24% of the tract population live below the poverty line.

A significant portion of the expansion target area falls within a third census tract. According to the 2000 Census, this tract is home to 9,835 residents, 85.08% of these residents are minority (8,368). Many of the residents are African American (5,202) and Hispanic (2,175). The census classifies this tract as a middle income area in which 19% of the tract population live below the poverty line. This study used data from all of these census tracts.

Methods

This research is based on a yearlong evaluation of a Weed and Seed strategy operating in a metropolitan community of New York City. The study period began in November 2007 and concluded at the end of October 2008. The primary goal of the study was to evaluate the success of the program.²

Data

Data were obtained over the course of the study period from several different sources. First, official crime statistics were obtained from the NYPD through the Compstat program. While very general, these statistics can provide some insight the official crime situation for the evaluation period. Additional data was collected through community surveys. The community survey was designed following an examination of both previous Weed and Seed and policy based research (see Eterno, 2007) as well as planning sessions with academic researchers. Among the items the survey measured were residents' perception of crime in the community; residents' satisfaction with components of community structure (i.e. jobs, education, and housing); residents' satisfaction with official agencies operating in the community (NYPD, Queens County District Attorney, and the New York City

Housing Authority); residents' awareness of the Weed and Seed program operating in the community; and residents' concerns with respect to the community.

The community survey was administered in three individual waves. The first wave of surveys was distributed in June 2008 during a community event at a large housing project in the community. The second wave of surveys was distributed during a second community event in August 2008. The third wave of surveys was distributed at another community event, also during August 2008. All the community events were well attended by residents and occurred in both the original target area and in the expansion target area. During these three community events, a total of 85 surveys were administered and returned for the evaluation. While small in size, this sample is relatively consistent with other Weed and Seed evaluations.³ Participation in filling out the surveys was voluntary, and participants were informed that their responses were anonymous. The data collected were then imported into the Statistical Program for the Social Sciences (SPSS). The pooled results from all three waves of surveys appear in the Results section.

Measures

Residents' Perception of Crime in the Community. Residents were first asked to indicate their perception of crime in their neighborhood. By using a five-point ordinal scale (1 = much worse, 2 = worse, 3 = about the same, 4 = better, and 5 = much better), residents indicated how the following crimes changed since the previous year of 2007: violent crime, property crime, gang crime, youth crime, fear of crime, drug crime, gun crime, and graffiti. These types of crimes were selected for the analysis as the evaluation identified them as significant issues in the community.

Fear of Neighborhood Crime. Respondents were asked to indicate their personal level of fear of crime in the neighborhood and how this level varied since the previous year of 2007 along a five-point ordinal scale (1 = much worse, 2 = worse, 3 = about the same, 4 = better, and 5 = much better).

Satisfaction With Law Enforcement Agencies Operating in the Community. As the role of law enforcement in the Weed and Seed strategy is crucial to overall program success, assessing resident satisfaction with the law enforcement agencies in the community (NYPD and the Queens County District Attorney's Office) provides valuable insight into the relationship between law enforcement and residents in the Weed and Seed area, many of whom are minority. As noted, previous research has identified significant rifts between the NYPD and minority residents of New York City after the shift from community oriented policing to zero-tolerance policing in the early 1990s (see Eterno, 2001; Eterno &

Silverman, 2006; Green, 1999). Satisfaction with law enforcement was measured by using an eight-point ordinal scale. Residents were asked to rate their satisfaction with both the NYPD and the Queens County District Attorney's Office with regard to their operations and activities in the community.

Demographic Characteristics

Dichotomous (dummy) variables were used to measure the gender of the respondents (0 = male and 1 = female) and race (0 = not minority, 1 = minority). Four-point ordinal scales were used to measure additional demographic characteristics, including age (1 = younger than 20, 2 = 20–40, 3 = 41–60, and 4 = 61 and older) and education levels (1 = less than high school; 2 = high school graduate; 3 = some college; and 4 = college graduate). Table 1 outlines these characteristics of the residents surveyed. As Table 1 illustrates, the majority of the respondents are both Black and Hispanic. Additionally, most are relatively young—64% are 40 years old or younger. Also, most of those surveyed (67%) report that their educational level is at the high school graduate level or below.

Table 1. *Demographic Characteristics of Survey Respondents in the NY City Weed and Seed Target Area*

Characteristic	Percentage (N = 85)
Age	
< 20 years	33
20–40	31
41 – 60	27
61+	7
Gender	
Male	29
Female	67
Race	
Not Minority	15
Minority	78
Education	
< High School	19
High School Graduate	48
Some College	17
College Graduate	13

Results

This research is primarily concerned with assessing the impact and effectiveness of community oriented policing as a strategic component of a major neighborhood-level community crime reduction program (i.e. Weed and Seed). As stated previously, some insight into the effectiveness of a community oriented policing strategy can be ascertained by examining the success of its policies, and the current study discusses the effectiveness of the community oriented policing strategies of the NYPD in light of the agency's participation and activities in the Weed and Seed strategy operating in a metropolitan area of New York City.

Also as noted earlier, the success of a Weed and Seed strategy depends on the strength of the community oriented policing program operating in the specified neighborhood. The strength of the community oriented policing program, as far as its intended effect on the Weed and Seed strategy, further depends on three factors: (1) positive levels of satisfaction with law enforcement operating in the community; (2) a decrease in crime rates; and (3) low levels of fear of crime among neighborhood residents.

Level of Satisfaction With Law Enforcement

Findings from the evaluation revealed that the majority of the residents surveyed were not satisfied with law enforcement operating in their community. Sixty-eight percent of the residents reported dissatisfaction with the NYPD operating in the neighborhood. In addition to the NYPD, the law enforcement segment of the Weed and Seed strategy consists of the local district attorney's office prosecution of offenders. Similar to the previous finding, 68% of the residents surveyed reported dissatisfaction with the Queens County District Attorney's Office. A primary aspect of program success of the Weed and Seed strategy are positive levels of satisfaction with law enforcement operating in the neighborhood. As the Department of Justice states, the mission of community oriented policing is to help establish these positive levels of satisfaction among community members. The findings that the majority of residents are dissatisfied with the role the NYPD plays in their neighborhood suggest that community oriented policing in New York City does not support the success of the Weed and Seed strategy, which depends on an effective community oriented policing program. Additionally, these findings support previous research that highlighted the disconnect between many of New York City's minority residents and the NYPD (see Eterno & Silverman, 2006).

Neighborhood Crime Rates

When assessing neighborhood crime rates, both official crime statistics and citizen perception of crime levels are vital in understanding the true crime situation at the neighborhood level. Findings from the evaluation reveal substantial differences in the official crime statistics and citizens' perceptions of neighborhood crime levels. According to the official crime statistics published by the NYPD's Compstat Unit, rates for violent murder and robbery in the Weed and Seed neighborhoods have increased, while other violent crimes, namely rape and felony assault, have decreased. During the evaluation period, the NYPD reports that neighborhood murder rates increased 125% and robbery rates increased 14.6%. As noted, some violent crime decreased in the neighborhood. During the evaluation period, the incidence of rape declined 16.6%, and the number of felony assault decreased 5.8%.

While the official statistics the NYPD published are mixed, results from the community surveys indicate a very different picture. The community survey asked residents to rate, on a scale of 1 to 8, whether they believed a particular crime was either "much worse" or "much better" when comparing 2008 with 2007. Results indicate that the vast majority of the residents surveyed reported that many types of crimes were either "worse" or "much worse." For example, 84% of the residents reported that they believe that violent crime in 2008 is "worse" or "much worse" compared with 2007. Likewise, 83% reported that they believe that gang crime is "worse" or "much worse" than during the previous year. Similarly, 83% indicated that they believe that youth crime is "worse" or "much worse" than during the previous year. Additionally, 89% reported that they believe that gun violence is "worse" or "much worse" than during the previous year, and 69% indicated that they believe drug crime is "worse" or "much worse" than during the previous year. These findings indicate that while crime may have, according to the NYPD, decreased in some instances (rape and felony assault), community residents perceive that neighborhood crime levels have worsened since 2007.

These findings lend additional support to the argument that community oriented policing in New York City is not working as it should be as the strength of community oriented policing can be partially assessed by a measured decrease in neighborhood crime. Such findings also indicate that the NYPD is, in fact, practicing zero-tolerance policing. Citizen perceptions of neighborhood crime levels play an important role in assessing overall program effectiveness of the Weed and Seed strategy as well as the strength of community oriented policing in this New York City neighborhood. This finding also provides some insight as to the effectiveness, in a broader sense, of the role of law enforcement in this particular community and its participation in the Weed and Seed strategy as a necessary component. Results in this study indicate that success of the law

enforcement component in the Weed and Seed strategy is somewhat conflicted as there is a substantial disconnect between official crime statistics and community perceptions of crime levels.

Fear of Crime Among Neighborhood Residents

Another measure of the strength of a community oriented policing program is the level of fear of crime among neighborhood residents (see Cordner, 1995; Dietz, 1997; Riechers & Roberg, 1990). One of the tenets of community oriented policing is that police officers' development of strong bonds with neighborhood residents helps reduce crime and, subsequently, reduces residents' fear of crime. As the findings so far indicate that community oriented policing in New York City is not effective, the following finding is of little surprise. The community survey asked residents to rate their level of fear of neighborhood crime on a scale from "much worse" to "much better" than during the previous year of 2007. Sixty-seven percent of residents surveyed reported that their level of fear of crime is either "worse" or "much worse" since 2007.

The finding that the majority of residents in the Weed and Seed neighborhood report that they are more fearful of crime in 2008 compared with 2007 further indicates a weak community policing strategy. A statement by an older female resident who volunteered to fill out a neighborhood survey exemplifies the residents' feeling: "My grandkids are unable to come out everyday they want to come out...I have to say no [to them]. I'm also staying in the house. I'm only out [at this community event] because the police are out here...when they leave, I leave."

The fact that many community residents are fearful of crime in the community and many, as indicated, are not satisfied with the efforts of law enforcement in controlling neighborhood crime indicates that the relationships between law enforcement and residents within this particular community are not strong.

Discussion and Conclusion

Results from the community surveys illustrate that the majority of residents are dissatisfied with the NYPD and the role of law enforcement operating in the Weed and Seed neighborhood. Additionally, a substantial disconnect between the NYPD and the residents of the Weed and Seed area exists as residents' perceptions regarding crime incidence differ from actual incidence in the NYPD's Compstat reports; that is, the NYPD is spreading the word that crime has fallen drastically throughout the city, when in reality, community residents are reporting that many crimes are on the increase in their neighborhoods. Findings also indicate that fear of crime levels among neighborhood residents in the Weed and Seed area are substantial when compared with the previous year of 2007.

The Department of Justice outlines measures of success of community oriented policing. An analysis of these measures, which include resident satisfaction with neighborhood law enforcement, a measurable decrease in crime rates, and low levels of fear of crime among residents, can ascertain the strength of a community oriented policing program. In addition to revealing the shortcomings of this particular Weed and Seed strategy in this New York City community, these findings indicate that community oriented policing is a weak police strategy of the NYPD within this particular community and quite possibly led to the overall failure of the Weed and Seed strategy, which, as noted, depends on a successful community oriented policing strategy.

As with any policy and program evaluation, there are some significant policy implications as well as recommendations in light of these findings. First, the Department of Justice, in funding a policy that depends on a policing model that has been considerably weakened and even replaced by a more dominant policing strategy, has essentially sponsored a policy with odds stacked against its success. That is, with the success of the Weed and Seed strategy essentially dependent on the strategy of community oriented policing, assessment of the strength of the selected area's community oriented policing strategy should be a prerequisite to funding. Even a cursory review of the scientific literature examining the community oriented policing capabilities of the NYPD reveals that some major weaknesses exist. First, the NYPD has adopted more aggressive zero-tolerance policing strategies and has turned away from more community-based policing. Second, the relationship between many minority residents of New York City and the NYPD is significantly weak. In the current research, the Weed and Seed strategy was situated in a mostly minority community. As such, the overall success of the strategy was essentially an uphill battle against a weakened policing strategy and significant resident-police division.

As this paper illustrates, there is a significant need for more effective theory-practice integration. As changes and shifts in police practice and policy are implemented, concurrent changes must occur in crime prevention programs because programs whose effectiveness depends on inactive practices and policies cannot be successful. Law enforcement agencies must implement crime prevention programs that fit the revised practices and policies; that is, they must minimize the inconsistencies between theory and practice for criminal justice programs to produce more effective results. The current research demonstrates that inconsistencies between the practices and policies of the NYPD and the theoretical framework of the Weed and Seed strategy helped contribute to an overall ineffective neighborhood-level crime reduction strategy.

Another recommendation based on these findings concerns the NYPD taking a more proactive approach in rebuilding its relationship with the minority communities of New

York City. As discussed, there is a significant divide between the NYPD and many Black residents of the City. Caused by a series of controversial events, including shootings of unarmed persons, this relationship has worsened over time. Community oriented policing, if used properly, can rebuild these tarnished relationships. The fact that this disconnect between the Black community and the NYPD has not improved is further evidence that the NYPD is not using its community oriented policing strategy. In fact, as CCRB data and this study's findings indicate, there is evidence that this disconnect is actually increasing. Blacks are reporting illegal police abuse at record rates each year in New York City. Without the assistance of community oriented policing, resources to repair this disconnect are severely limited. With zero-tolerance policing in place, the challenges associated with improving community-level issues increase.

Acknowledgement

The author would like to thank Dr. John A. Eterno, Associate Dean and Associate Professor of Criminal Justice at Molloy College, for his close guidance during the writing of this article.

Notes

1. This research was funded by a United States Department of Justice, Community Capacity Development Office Weed and Seed Grant Award # 2007-WS-Q7-0048.
2. The author was obtained as an independent academic consultant by the stakeholders of the strategy.
3. Sample size is relatively consistent with other Weed and Seed evaluation research.

References

- Cordner, G. W. (1995). Community policing: Elements and effects. *Police Forum*, 5(3), 1–8.
- Dietz, S. A. (1997). Evaluating community policing: Quality police service and fear of crime. *Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management*, 20(1), 83–100.
- Eterno, J. A. (2001). Zero tolerance policing within democracies: The dilemma of controlling crime without increasing police abuse of power. *Police Practice and Research: An International Journal*, 2(3), 189–217.
- Eterno, J. A. (2003). *Policing within the law*. Westport, CT: Praeger.

- Eterno, J. A. (2007). Public Housing Safety Initiative in Far Rockaway and East New York. (Final report submitted to the United States Attorney's Office, Eastern District of New York.) New York: Author.
- Eterno, J. A., & Silverman, E. B. (2006). The New York City police department's Compstat: Dream or nightmare? *International Journal of Police Science and Management*, 8(3), 218–231.
- Fyfe, J. J., Greene, J. R., Walsh, W. F., Wilson, O. W., & McLaren, R. C. (1997). *Police administration* (5th ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Greene, J. (1999). Zero-tolerance: A case study of police policies and practices in New York City. *Crime and Delinquency*, 45(2), 171–187.
- Haberman, C. (1997, September 12). Civil tones on a topic of violence. *The New York Times*, p. B1.
- Kania, R. E. (2004). A brief history of a venerable paradigm in policing. *Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice*, 20(1), 80–83.
- Kelling, G. L. & Coles, C. M. (1997). *Fixing broken windows: Restoring order and reducing crime in our communities*. New York: Touchtone Press.
- Riechers, L. M., & Roberg, R. R. (1990). Community policing: A critical review of underlying assumptions. *Journal of Police Science and Administration*, 17(2), 105–114.
- Silverman, E. B. (1999). *NYPD battles crime: Innovative strategies in policing*. Boston: Northeastern University Press.
- Skolnick, J. H. (1999). *Ideas in American policing*. Washington, DC: Police Foundation.
- U.S. Department of Justice, Community Capacity Development Office. (n.d.). *Weed & seed*. Retrieved May 28, 2009, from <http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ccdo/ws/welcome.html>
- Walsh, W. F., & Vito, G. F. (2004). The meaning of Compstat: Analysis and response. *Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice*, 20(1), 51–69.

Understanding Staff Perceptions of Turnover in Corrections

Kevin I. Minor, Cherie Dawson-Edwards, James B. Wells,
Carl Griffith, and Earl Angel

Correctional staff turnover is a critically important but under-researched topic, and studies are lacking of how staff perceive the problem. By using a descriptive survey method, this study examined such perceptions of turnover among a sample of correctional officers. Staff attributed turnover to insufficient pay and benefits as well as to key areas of the work environment, including interpersonal conflicts, stress, unfavorable treatment and lack of recognition from superiors, and perceived lack of input. A third of respondents indicated they are likely to leave their jobs in the next three years. We conclude that correctional staff may consider alternative employment prospects and contemplate turnover when they experience a sense of devaluation, especially where devaluation is accompanied by perceptions of low efficacy on the job.

Key Words: corrections • correctional staff • employee turnover • employee perceptions

Employee turnover has been studied across various disciplines, and it is a serious problem in the field of corrections. Correctional agencies spend considerable funds from limited budgets on personnel recruitment, selection, and training (Kiekbusch, Price, & Thesis, 2003; Lambert & Hogan, 2006). High turnover, especially among staff who are relatively new, means that monetary and other resources invested in recruitment, hiring, and training do not produce desired returns. In turn, this situation can result in fewer resources available for initiatives to promote staff retention and development (e.g., pay raises and in-service training) as well as the for the betterment and management of offenders (e.g., inmate programs).

Of course, the problem involves much more than money. Correctional agencies with high turnover commonly confront a shortage of high performing, experienced, and skilled personnel. The result can be suspensions and delays of activities, breakdowns of continuity and consistency, and increased likelihood of mistakes (Roseman, 1981). The personnel who are available may end up working excess overtime, which, in addition to further straining budgets, can heighten job stress and burnout. Under such conditions,

Kevin I. Minor is professor and chair, Cherie Dawson-Edwards is assistant professor, James B. Wells is professor, and Carl Griffith is a student in the Department of Correctional and Juvenile Justice Studies, Eastern Kentucky University, Richmond, Kentucky. Earl Angel is a research associate in the College of Justice and Safety, Eastern Kentucky University, Richmond.

correctional environments can grow more volatile and potentially dangerous than usual. Moreover, these circumstances can fuel public stereotypes of correctional agencies as undesirable places to work—as jobs of last resort (Stohr, Self, & Lovrich, 1992). In short, high turnover often feeds on itself to intensify problems and undermine organizational effectiveness on a number of fronts.

Correctional staff turnover clearly deserves more attention than it has received in the criminal justice literature. Furthermore, nearly all studies conducted to date have focused on the relationship of turnover to two broad categories of variables: (1) staff demographic and background profiles and (2) organizational and work environment variables, including work-related attitudes (see Jurik & Winn, 1987). Other than research on turnover intentions (described below), we located few studies that have examined the problem of turnover as correctional staff themselves perceive it. Yet a focus on staff perceptions complements the focus of existing literature on background and work environment variables. In addition, a sound argument can be made that any agency should pay careful attention to the factors its own employees see as important in promoting and controlling turnover. Thus, the objective of this study is to examine the turnover problem as correctional staff members perceive it.

Literature Review

Correctional staff turnover is known to be related to organizational and work environment factors. Accordingly, there is considerable variation across correctional agencies in turnover volume. While average annual turnover can be as high as 45% in corrections, the best estimate seems to be in the range of 12% to 25% (Lambert, 2001; and see McShane, Williams, Schichor, & McClain, 1991; K. N. Wright, 1994).

The literature draws two distinctions as regards the study of correctional staff turnover. The first is between turnover that is voluntary and involuntary (Lambert, 2001, 2006; Price & Mueller, 1986). In the case of the former, the staff member initiates cessation of employment, while with the latter, the agency initiates cessation (e.g., layoffs and dismissals). Lambert suggests that this distinction is important because voluntary turnover is more frequent, most costly and disruptive to the organization, and the most amenable to curtailment. Indeed, dismissals are often in the best interest of the organization. For this reason, researchers tend to be most interested in voluntary turnover.

A second distinction is that between actual turnover and turnover intentions. Actual turnover is a behavioral construct, referring to an employee actually leaving the organization. On the other hand, intentions are a cognitive construct and refer to an employee planning to leave. The earlier studies of staff turnover in adult and juvenile corrections (e.g., Camp, 1994; T. A. Wright, 1993) focus on actual turnover. This is sensible in that an employee

who indicates intent to leave an agency might not actually end up doing so. Alternatively, one who indicates a plan to stay might actually leave on what amounts to a whim. However, Lambert (2006) makes a case that it is more feasible to obtain a reliable and valid measure of turnover intent compared with actual turnover, primarily due to potential inaccuracies and unavailability of agency records. He also argues that intention is the single best predictor of actual turnover behavior. More recent research has typically used measures of turnover intent (e.g., Kiekbusch et al., 2003; Mitchell, MacKenzie, Styve, & Gover, 2000; Tipton, 2002). Still, there are questions about the extent to which intent accurately predicts actual turnover behavior, and some have pointed out that the time frame is important in defining intent because as time increases the link between intent and actual turnover weakens (see Kirschenbaum & Weisberg, 1990).

As mentioned above, research on turnover and related issues in corrections has focused on individual background variables. Examples of these variables include age (Camp, 1994; Robinson, Porporino, & Simourd, 1997), gender (Jurik, 1985; Tipton, 2002), race (Ford, 1995; Jacobs & Grear, 1977; Jurik & Winn, 1987; Mitchell et al., 2000), and education (Jurik, Halemba, Musheno, & Boyle, 1987; Mitchell et al., 2000). Researchers have also examined variables related to the organization and work environment. Examples include job satisfaction (Byrd, Cochran, Silverman, & Blount, 2000; Dennis, 1998; Jurik & Winn, 1987; Udechukwu, Harrington, Manyak, Segal, & Graham, 2007; T. A. Wright, 1993); organizational commitment (Byrd et al., 2000; Camp, 1994; Griffin & Hepburn, 2005); and job stress (Byrd et al., 2000; Mitchell et al., 2000; Slate & Vogel, 1997).

Some investigators outside corrections have sought to model turnover (e.g., Kirschenbaum & Weisberg, 1990; Michaels & Spector, 1982; Mobley, Griffeth, Hand, & Meglino, 1979). These models usually conceptualize turnover in terms of the effect of moderator variables on intentions to voluntarily terminate employment. Lambert (2001) applied this logic to corrections and developed a model in which actual turnover behavior is seen as a direct effect of turnover intents. In Lambert's model, intent is the direct outcome of perceptions of alternative employment, work related attitudes such as job satisfaction, and individual characteristics. Organizational commitment mediates the effect of job satisfaction on intents. Both job satisfaction and organizational commitment, in turn, mediate the effect of personal and work environment factors.

Lambert (2006) tested this model by using survey data collected from staff at a high security state correctional facility with a population of about 1,000 male inmates. He reported that three individual factors (gender, education, and tenure) and two work environment factors (organizational commitment and job satisfaction) were significant predictors of turnover intention, with job satisfaction having the strongest effect. Lambert (2008) also reported no significant relationship between job involvement and turnover intention. In a more recent study

of staff working in a private prison, Lambert and Hogan (2009) found the most direct predictors of turnover intent to be age, job satisfaction, and organizational commitment.

As mentioned above, something missing from this body of literature is attention to the manner in which correctional staff members themselves account for turnover. As a process, turnover may actually begin long before the termination or departure of employment takes place. Referred to as psychological turnover, this may develop in an employee when certain experiences or events occur, such as being overlooked for promotion, conflicts at work, major organizational restructuring, or insufficient pay increases (Roseman, 1981). In addition to instances of psychological turnover that lead ultimately to employment cessation, turnover intent can remain even if an employee never voluntarily severs ties to the organization. We know from psychological research that the manner in which people attribute the causes of events and issues in their lives shapes what they expect to see happen and, in turn, how they behave (see Carver & Scheier, 2008; Schunk, 2008). So there is good reason to consider staff perceptions of the turnover issue.

There are two primary bases for correctional staff making attributions about turnover in their field. The first is experiential and derives from a staff member's own direct work history in corrections, both in the present agency and in places where she or he may have worked previously. The second basis is vicarious and derives from staff member socialization in the employee subculture generally and, more specifically, interactions with other correctional staff who have left their agencies or are planning to do so. The vicarious component consists of perceptions of why others have left the agency (or aim to do so) as well as perceptions of what those persons have accomplished by leaving (e.g., obtaining more pay and more desirable hours from alternative employment). As such, the present study is meant to complement and extend past research on turnover intentions by examining data on correctional employees' perceptions of the staff turnover problem.

Method

Correctional Facility and Participants

This study was conducted during late 2007 and early 2008 at a medium security state prison located in a rural area. The facility's inmate population is approximately 1,250 males. It has 285 staff members, approximately 200 of whom are correctional officers. While turnover data were not available for the particular facility, wider state Department of Corrections (DOC) turnover was 21% for the 2006 to 2007 time period (the most recent available).

The survey described below was administered to a random sample of 101 correctional officers selected for purposes of this research. The sample was stratified to ensure proportional representation by shift, gender, race, tenure, and rank (i.e., supervisor versus line staff), and proportionality was achieved on these variables. The survey response rate was 88.1% ($N = 89$).

The majority of respondents were male (82%) and Caucasian (97.7%), with 2.3% African American. Respondents ranged in age from 19 to 68 years, with a mean of 42 years ($SD = 12.3$). More than half (53.9%) the respondents indicated that their highest level of education completed was high school (either graduation or GED). More than a third (37.1%) indicated having completed some college credit without finishing a degree; 6.7% held an associate's degree, and 2.2% had baccalaureate degrees.

The majority of officers (78.7%) were line staff; 21.3% were supervisors. The average number of years worked in the field of corrections was 7.5 ($SD = 6.27$). The average number of years employed in the particular DOC was 7.0 ($SD = 6.02$), while the average years worked at the facility where the research was conducted was 6.8 ($SD = 6.05$). The average starting salary for a correctional officer in the DOC for 2005 (the most recent available) was \$25,565.

Survey Instrument

The survey instrument used in this study had five parts. The first part asked staff to provide an open-ended description of the top three reasons they believe correctional officers leave the DOC within three years of being hired. Part two asked staff to rate the importance of 15 factors in promoting officer turnover. Ratings were made on a five-point Likert scale, ranging from very unimportant (1) to very important (5). The factors were selected based on the literature review and on the basis of one of the author's 16 years of experience working in the DOC.

Part three of the survey was meant to assess participants' turnover intentions. Participants were asked to indicate (from the following options) the time frame in which they intend to leave the DOC and instructed to select only one option: 6 months, 12 months, 3 years, 5 years, 10 years, 15 years, or 20 years or more. Subsequently, participants were asked to provide an open-ended response describing the reason(s) for leaving in the indicated time frame, starting with the most important reason.

The fourth part of the survey was an open-ended item asking participants to describe the most important change(s) the DOC could implement to reduce staff turnover. The final part solicited the staff demographic and background information described above.

Survey participation was voluntary and anonymous. Following distribution to staff, surveys were returned in sealed envelopes.

Results

Survey Part 1

Low pay was overwhelmingly the major reason staff gave to account for turnover. Nearly 97% of respondents cited pay as one of the top three reasons new staff leave the DOC

within the first three years of being hired. Additionally, 37% cited insurance or benefits as a reason. More than 21% mentioned the need to find a “better” job or one closer to home.

However, not all reasons given related primarily to economics. Staff also cited key features of the work environment. For example, 29.2% listed interpersonal conflicts with coworkers or supervisors as reasons for staff departures, and 28.1% cited stress or the poor nature of the work environment. More than 20% made reference to unequal or unfavorable treatment of staff from supervisors.

Lesser proportions of respondents attributed turnover to other factors. Almost 17% referenced the nature of the work schedule (i.e., shifts and hours worked). Nearly 16% of respondents said that staff leave due to concerns or fears over personal safety. More than 11% stated that employees who leave do so when they learn the nature of the job is not what they expected. Other factors cited included staff shortages (9% of respondents) and poor training (7.9%).

Table 1. *Perceived Importance of Factors Potentially Contributing to Turnover (N = 89)*

Factor	Mean	SD
Inadequate pay scales	4.82	0.44
Concerns over personal safety	4.30	0.79
Concerns over institutional security	4.26	0.76
Officers not knowing what their supervisors expect	4.09	0.83
Officers not believing that senior management understands problems faced on the job	4.43	0.74
Problems with coworkers	3.91	1.05
Problems with inmates	3.84	1.03
Officers feeling they lack say over matters that most affect them	4.45	0.64
Lack of loyalty to the institution	4.01	0.95
Lack of satisfaction with the nature of the work	4.06	0.84
Stressful work environment	4.61	0.67
Inadequate training	4.13	0.88
Feeling that the job is dead-end with few opportunities to advance	3.96	0.95
Perceptions of better employment opportunities elsewhere	4.49	0.74
Job keeps them away from their family too much	3.66	1.11

Survey Part 2

Recall that the second part of the survey solicited staff ratings of the importance of various factors in promoting officer turnover. Ratings ranged from 1 (least important) to 5 (most important). Table 1 presents descriptive data.

As the table shows, no items had mean ratings below 3.66. Items with the highest mean ratings pertained to pay scales, work stress, perceptions of alternative employment, perceived lack of say over matters affecting staff, not believing managers understand the problems officers face, and the interrelated issues of personal safety concerns and concerns over institutional security. Other items with relatively high mean ratings include the inadequacy of training, officers feeling that they do not know what their supervisors expect, dissatisfaction with the nature of the work, and lack of loyalty to the institution.

Multiple *t*-tests were performed to determine the extent to which staff ratings of the factors in Table 1 varied by different staff categories based on demographics and backgrounds. Only one test yielded significant results. The mean rating (5.00, *SD* = .000) assigned to inadequate pay by women was significantly higher than the rating (4.78, *SD* = .479) assigned by men, $t(72) = 3.91, p = .000$, 2-tailed.

Correlations were computed to study the relationship between ratings and continuous staff demographic variables. Four significant relationships were found, two involving education and two involving age. Compared with staff with higher education levels, those with less education rated "concerns over institutional security" as a more important cause of turnover ($r = -.27, p = .01$). Similarly, staff with less education had higher ratings of the factor "officers not knowing what their supervisors expect" ($r = -.26, p = .02$). Ratings on this same factor decreased as age increased ($r = -.23, p = .04$). Finally, ratings on the factor "officers feeling they lack say over matters that most affect them" declined with increasing age ($r = -.24, p = .03$).

Survey Part 3

Table 2 shows the proportion of respondents indicating that they are likely to leave the DOC within the various time frames. As the table reveals, more than 20% of the respondents said they were likely to leave in the coming three years, and 11.5% indicated a likelihood to leave in the coming year. On the other hand, more than 55% selected 10 years or longer as the time frame.

Given that more than half of the staff said they plan to stay with the DOC at least another decade, it is not surprising that the most commonly cited reason for departure (58.4% of respondents) was retirement. (These DOC staff members are eligible to retire after 20 years of service.) But other reasons were also given. Nearly 15% expressed a desire to find a different or better job. Similarly, 11.2% cited poor pay as a reason for their turnover intentions. Other explanations included stress (4.5%), safety concerns (3.4%), lack of opportunities for promotion, (3.4%), and the way staff feel they are treated (3.4%); the latter category included mention of poor or unequal treatment and lack of recognition.

Table 2. *Percentage of Respondents Likely to Leave DOC in Specified Time Periods (N = 87)^a*

Time Period	N	%
6 months	1	1.1
1 year	10	11.5
3 years	18	20.7
5 years	10	11.5
10 years	17	19.5
15 years	9	10.3
20 years or more	22	25.3

^a Two study participants did not answer this question.

Survey Part 4

The respondents identified a number of important changes they believed the DOC might make to reduce staff turnover. Improved pay was by far the most commonly cited change (89.9% of respondents). Similarly, 29.2% made reference to improved insurance and benefits. Almost 32% described the need for improved treatment and recognition of officers.

Other changes were mentioned with less frequency. These included improved communication and teamwork (9%), hiring of additional staff (5.6%), improved hiring practices (3.4%), improvements to work environment safety (3.4%), provision of better equipment (3.4%), improved opportunities for promotion (2.2%), and better public perceptions of corrections (1.1%).

Discussion and Conclusion

A high level of correctional staff turnover can feed off itself to exacerbate problems, impair organizational effectiveness, and promote even more turnover. We have suggested that any correctional agency can benefit by identifying and attending to factors its employees perceive as important in promoting and controlling turnover. These employees are uniquely positioned to understand the problem due to their own direct experiences as well as their interactions with and observations of other employees.

The causal attributions people make about issues they encounter affect their expectations and behaviors (Carver & Scheier, 2008; Schunk, 2008). It is reasonable to believe that employees of all organizations have ideas about causes of organizational problems generally and, in particular, about why people might leave an organization. Direct and vicarious experiences in an organization help establish and confirm (or disconfirm) employees' attributions regarding organizational problems, and in this ongoing manner, employee attributions concerning turnover could affect turnover intents and ultimately behavior.

In many respects, the participants in this study mirrored the traditional prototype of correctional officers. For instance, they were employed in a rural geographical area in a medium security male institution. They were predominantly male, Caucasian, middle aged, lacking a college degree, and employed in line positions. Almost 21% indicated they were likely to leave the DOC over the next three years, and 11.5% said they were likely to leave within a year. This one-year intent figure approaches the lower end of the 12 to 25% actual turnover range referenced in the literature (Lambert, 2001) but is only about half the most recently available (2006–2007) DOC-wide actual figure of 21%. By the same token, the facility seems to have a relatively stable core of staff planning to retire from the DOC. More than 55% of the respondents said they planned to stay with the DOC for 10 years or longer, and more than a quarter intended to stay 20 years or more. On average, respondents had already worked at the facility for nearly 7 years. So there is evidence of core stability amid higher than desired levels of turnover.

It is worth noting that there was minimal variation across subgroups of staff in their perceptions of reasons for turnover. From the standpoint of statistical significance, women rated inadequate pay at a higher level of importance than men, but the mean difference in ratings was too small (0.22 points) to be of much practical significance. There were also a few significant correlations by education and age, but, all in all, there was a strong pattern of homogeneity in staff perceptions. Perhaps most important, there were no significant differences in ratings by employee rank. Line officers and supervisors provided similar ratings. The same holds for tenure in the field of corrections generally, tenure with the DOC, and tenure at the facility. In this study, therefore, there is no evidence that turnover attributions are a function of rank or tenure.

People who have spent time employed in the field know that corrections work can be demanding, stressful, and potentially dangerous. It is too frequently characterized by low pay and a dearth of other rewards, such as status and recognition from the public, supervisors, and other parties. Such as they exist, rewards are largely intrinsic and come in the form of employees believing they are performing the job effectively, both individually and as part of the organization (i.e., a sense of efficacy). In short, the job is very important but, in many respects, thankless. Intrinsic rewards, such as believing that one is able to help make a positive difference, become paramount almost by default.

The data from this study support this portrayal of correctional work. Specifically, the respondents perceived staff turnover as resulting from insufficient pay and benefits as well as from the availability of alternative employment. Almost all respondents listed low pay as one of the top three reasons for turnover among new recruits. Pay received the highest mean rating of any item in Part 2 of the survey, and almost 90% of respondents said the DOC could reduce turnover by improving pay. However, only 11.2% of respondents cited

poor pay as a reason they personally intended to leave the DOC. Clearly, then, poor pay received more weight in accounting for the turnover of coworkers than for explaining employees' own intentions. Indeed, other researchers have not found pay and benefits to affect turnover significantly (e.g., Camp, 1994; Lambert, 2006).

However, perceptions of alternative employment may be a different matter entirely. Recall that in his model, Lambert (2001) hypothesized that turnover intentions were a direct outcome of perceptions of alternative employment availability. And, in fact, Kieckbusch et al. (2003) reported that perceptions of the economy and outside job opportunities were predictive of turnover among jail employees. By definition, though, perceptions of alternative employment are fluid and contingent on the time frame a study considers. Interestingly, the data for this study were collected during the latter part of 2007 and early in 2008, a few months *before* the major downturn in the United States economy that became manifest in mid 2008 with the fall of the housing market, soaring fuel prices, and the ensuing demise of banks, securities, and major corporations. Along with these developments, unemployment became so problematic that massive job creation has been made central to the Obama Administration's economic recovery plan. These developments are bound to influence the role of perceived alternative employment opportunities in affecting turnover. At present (first quarter of 2009), fewer staff in the DOC studied (relative to the number surveyed in late 2007 and early 2008) might see alternative employment prospects as plentiful or desirable, but this could change with success from job creation initiatives and added competition for workers.

Some of the less tangible but no less important work environment factors that have been linked to turnover in past research (e.g., Byrd et al., 2000; Lambert, 2006; Mitchell et al., 2000) also emerged in this study. A sizeable proportion of respondents (nearly 30%) identified interpersonal conflicts as one of the top three reasons for employee turnover, almost as many cited stress, and more than 20% referenced unfavorable treatment from supervisors. Similarly, also receiving high ratings were the items in Part 2 dealing with officers feeling that management does not understand problems faced on the job and officers feeling they lack say over matters affecting them. Nearly 32% of respondents identified better treatment and recognition of officers as a means for the DOC to control turnover.

Some of the perceptions just described (i.e., unfavorable treatment and lack of recognition from superiors, feeling misunderstood, and sensing a lack of say over matters directly affecting officers), when combined with the perceptions of insufficient pay and benefits mentioned above, paint a portrait of officers perceiving themselves as devalued for what they do. It is reasonable to suppose that people who perform work that is demanding, stressful, potentially dangerous, and yet very necessary to society need to sense their contributions and sacrifices are valued. However, this is unlikely to the extent

employees believe that their pay and benefits are inadequate, they are not sufficiently recognized in other ways, they are poorly treated, and their input is nonexistent or disregarded. The outcome is likely to be a converse sense of devaluation.

The devaluation construct underscores the point made earlier about correctional work involving a paucity of external rewards, such that motivation to continue in the field becomes heavily reliant upon intrinsic factors. One of the foremost of these factors may be individual and collective efficacy (Bandura, 1997, 2001). Unfortunately data to address the issue are lacking from the present study, but a tenable hypothesis is that increases in both turnover intentions and behavior are especially probable when perceptions of devaluation of the kind this research uncovered conjoin with perceptions of low efficacy among staff. When this occurs, there is nothing to bind the employee to the agency, except perhaps the need for a paycheck and benefits of some form; ergo, the attractiveness of alternative employment.

Low efficacy perceptions could arise from any number of conceivable sources not assessed in this study (e.g., jurisdictional policy changes, physical limitations developed by an employee, absence of resources for inmate programming, political dynamics, etc.). However, an important potential source that did surface in this study (as a factor important in promoting turnover) involves conflicts with coworkers or supervisors. A work environment riddled with conflict among staff is hardly one where staff are likely to believe they are advancing organizational goals in an optimal way. A further source of low efficacy could be high levels of employee turnover among coworkers. As pointed out earlier, high turnover consumes resources that could be used to promote effectiveness in other areas of an organization. It can lead to breakdowns in continuity, job stress, burnout, and mistakes. In short, staff conflict and turnover are not conducive to a sense of efficacy among people who remain in the organization.

The findings of this study imply the need for continued efforts to improve the pay and benefits of correctional officers, at least in the facility studied and in similar ones. It would be easy to minimize the importance of such efforts in view of: (a) the finding that more employees see inadequate pay and benefits as important in accounting for turnover among other staff than in accounting for their own personal turnover intents and (b) other research showing that pay and benefits are not significantly related to turnover (see Lambert, 2006). Still, the presence of a substantial proportion of staff who believe poor pay and benefits are among the top reasons their coworkers leave the organization is likely to detract from morale and organizational effectiveness. Also, it seems clear that efforts to improve pay and benefits are important for recruiting top quality staff to the field.

Additionally, inadequate pay and benefits constitute one, but certainly not the only and possibly not even the most important, basis for employees feeling devalued for their

work. Concerns over pay and benefits may become intensified to the extent that these are part of a larger composite of factors promoting a sense of devaluation. Examples of other factors this study identified include perceptions of unfavorable treatment, lack of understanding and recognition, and lack of opportunity for input. This implies the need for initiatives other than improved pay and benefits to make staff feel more valued.

For instance, some jurisdictions have instituted periodic recognitions for officers exhibiting excellent performance. However, initiatives need not be so formal or competitive to be effective. An administrator who practices "management by walking around," takes time to inform staff that they are valued and appreciated, and endeavors to establish rapport with subordinates can accomplish a great deal in this regard.

In terms of opportunities for staff input, there are various ways to increase participation in decision making and promote greater staff autonomy. Interestingly enough, such initiatives have also been demonstrated to be associated with reductions in job stress (Auerbach, Quick, & Pegg, 2003; Dowden & Tellier, 2004; Wright, Saylor, Gilman, & Camp, 1997), another major factor that staff in this study saw as contributing to turnover. And in fact, Slate and Vogel (1997) reported that thoughts about quitting among correctional staff are linked with perceptions of an organizational atmosphere that is negative toward staff participation in decision making.

Staff members usually have much knowledge of problems and issues faced at their facilities. A more decentralized, participative approach to institutional management that makes use of advisory groups and decision-making bodies comprising staff can draw upon this knowledge. The point is to minimize line staff detachment from management and managerial issues. Approaches of this nature could also promote a heightened sense of efficacy among staff (cf. Wells, Minor, Angel, Matz, & Amato, 2009).

Future research seems warranted into staff perceptions surrounding the turnover problem. Data for the present study came from a single facility, the number of cases was limited, and the data obtained were largely descriptive in nature. Future investigations could use larger samples with greater variation in staff demographics and facilities. While descriptive studies such as this are valuable for generating hypotheses, data collection instruments could be redesigned to allow for more inferential analyses and multivariate modeling.

This study raises the need for additional inquiry into possible discrepancies between why employees believe their coworkers exhibit turnover and why they personally contemplate leaving. Likewise, the construct of devaluation this study developed should receive more attention, specifically attention to further establishing construct validity and examining the potential sources. Finally, future investigations could explore the interaction this study proposed between perceptions of devaluation and low perceptions of efficacy as a reason for staff opting to explore alternative employment. It may turn out that in a

model such as the one Lambert (2001) proposed, perceptions of alternative employment mediate the effects of devaluation and low perceptions of efficacy on turnover intents. If research was to establish the importance of such a connection in prompting decisions to leave, efforts designed to promote a greater sense of valuation among staff could be integrated with initiatives to foster greater efficacy and overcome bureaucratic and political barriers to staff sensing they are accomplishing something worthwhile in their work with offenders. In short, the subject of correctional staff turnover continues to provide fertile ground for theory and research.

References

- Auerbach, S. M., Quick, B. G., & Pegg, P. O. (2003). General job stress and job-specific stress in juvenile correctional officers. *Journal of Criminal Justice, 31*, 25–36.
- Bandura, A. (1997). *Self-efficacy: The exercise of control*. New York: Freeman.
- Bandura, A. (2001). Social cognitive theory: An agentic perspective. *Annual Review of Psychology, 52*, 1–26.
- Byrd, T. G., Cochran, J. K., Silverman, I. J., & Blount, W. R. (2000). Behind bars: An assessment of the effects of job satisfaction, job-related stress, and anxiety on jail employees' inclinations to quit. *Journal of Crime and Justice, 23*, 69–93.
- Camp, S. D. (1994). Assessing the effects of organizational commitment and job satisfaction on turnover: An event history approach. *The Prison Journal, 74*, 279–305.
- Carver, C. C., & Scheier, M. F. (2008). *Perspectives on personality* (6th ed.). Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon.
- Dennis, G. L. (1998). Here today, gone tomorrow: How management style affects job satisfaction and, in turn, employee turnover. *Corrections Today, 60*, 96–102.
- Dowden, C., & Tellier, C. (2004). Predicting work-related stress in correctional officers: A meta-analysis. *Journal of Criminal Justice, 32*, 31–47.
- Ford, M. (1995). Job performance and job tenure of jailers. In N. A. Jackson (Ed), *Contemporary issues in criminal justice: Shaping tomorrow's system* (pp. 243–257). New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Griffin, M. L., & Hepburn, J. R. (2005). Side-bets and reciprocity as determinants of organizational commitment among correctional officers. *Journal of Criminal Justice, 33*, 611–625.

Minor, Dawson-Edwards, Wells, Griffith, and Angel

Jacobs, J. B., & Grear, M. P. (1977). Drop outs and rejects: An analysis of the prison guard's revolving door. *Criminal Justice Review*, 2, 57–70.

Jurik, N. C. (1985). An officer and a lady: Organizational barriers to women working as correctional officers in men's prisons. *Social Problems*, 32, 375–388.

Jurik, N. C., Halemba, G. J., Musheno, M. C., & Boyle, B. (1987). Education attainment, job satisfaction, and the professionalism of correctional officers. *Work and Occupations*, 14, 106–125.

Jurik, N. C., & Winn, R. (1987). Describing correctional-security dropout and rejects: An individual or organizational profile? *Criminal Justice and Behavior*, 14, 5–25.

Kieckbusch, R., Price, W., & Thesis, J. (2003). Turnover predictions: Causes of employee turnover in sheriff-operated jails. *Criminal Justice Studies*, 16, 67–76.

Kirschenbaum, A., & Weisberg, J. (1990). Predicting worker turnover: An assessment of intent on actual separations. *Human Relations*, 43, 829–847.

Lambert, E. G. (2001). To stay or quit: A review of the literature on correctional staff turnover. *American Journal of Criminal Justice*, 26, 61–76.

Lambert, E. G. (2006). I want to leave: A test of a model of turnover intent among correctional staff. *Applied Psychology in Criminal Justice*, 2, 57–83.

Lambert, E. G. (2008). The effect of job involvement on correctional staff. *Professional Issues in Criminal Justice*, 3, 1–19.

Lambert, E., & Hogan, N. (2006, November). A test of model of turnover intent among correctional staff at a midwestern private prison. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Society of Criminology, Los Angeles, CA. Retrieved May, 7, 2008, from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p114872_index.html (Interlibrary Loan).

Lambert, E. G., & Hogan, N. (2009). The importance of job satisfaction and organizational commitment in shaping turnover intent: A test of a causal model. *Criminal Justice Review*, 34, 96–118.

McShane, M. D., Williams, F. P., III, Schichor, D., & McClain, K. (1991). Early exits: Examining employee turnover. *Corrections Today*, 53, 220–225.

Michaels, C. E., & Spector, P. E. (1982). Causes of employee turnover: A test of the Mobley, Griffeth, Hand, and Meglino model. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 67, 53–59.

Mitchell, O., MacKenzie, D. L., Styve, G. J., & Gover, A. (2000). The impact of individual, organizational, and environmental attributes on voluntary turnover among juvenile correctional staff members. *Justice Quarterly*, 17, 333–357.

56 *Professional Issues in Criminal Justice* Vol 4(2), 2009

- Mobley, W. H., Griffeth, R. W., Hand, H. H., & Meglino, B. M. (1979). Review and conceptual analysis of the employee turnover process. *Psychological Bulletin*, 86, 493–522.
- Price, J., & Mueller, C. (1986). *Absenteeism and turnover among hospital employees*. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
- Robinson, D., Porporino, F. J., & Simourd, L. (1997). The influence of educational attainment on the attitudes and job performance of correctional officers. *Crime & Delinquency*, 43, 60–77.
- Roseman, E. (1981). *Managing employee turnover: A positive approach*. New York: Amacom.
- Schunk, D. H. (2008). *Learning theories: An educational perspective* (5th ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson.
- Slate, R. N., & Vogel, R. E. (1997). Participative management and correctional personnel: A study of the perceived atmosphere for participation in correctional decision making and its impact on employee stress and thoughts about quitting. *Journal of Criminal Justice*, 25, 397–408.
- Stohr, M. K., Self, R. L., & Lovrich, N. P. (1992). Staff turnover in new generation jails: An investigation of its causes and prevention. *Journal of Criminal Justice*, 20, 455–478.
- Tipton, J. A. (2002). Attitudes and perceptions of South Carolina's juvenile correctional officers, insight into the turnover epidemic. *Journal of Crime & Justice*, 25, 81–98.
- Udechukwu, I., Harrington, W., Manyak, T., Segal, S., & Graham, S. (2007). The Georgia Department of Corrections: An exploratory reflection on correctional officer turnover and its correlates. *Public Personal Management*, 36, 247–268.
- Wells, J. B., Minor, K. I., Angel, E., Matz, A. K., & Amato, N. (2009). Predictors of job stress among staff in juvenile correctional facilities. *Criminal Justice and Behavior*, 36, 245–258.
- Wright, K. N. (1994). *Effective prison leadership*. Binghamton, NY: William Neil.
- Wright, K. N., Saylor, W. G., Gilman, E., & Camp, C. (1997). Job control and occupational outcomes among prison workers. *Justice Quarterly*, 14, 525–546.
- Wright, T. A. (1993). Correctional employee turnover: A longitudinal study. *Journal of Criminal Justice*, 21, 131–142.

Trust in Police Officer-Sergeant Relationships¹

T. Jacob Stull

Trust ranks as the most important characteristic of effective supervisor-subordinate relationships. This is said to be even more important in military and paramilitary organizations, specifically police departments. This study measures the perceived trust between police officers and sergeants in a western police department. Sergeants ($n = 19$) and officers ($n = 50$) completed 25-item surveys by using a seven-point Likert scale, rating how prevalent each item is in their current situation, how much they would like it to exist, and how important it is to them. The study measured five components of trust: integrity, competence, consistency, loyalty, and openness. Three hypotheses were not supported by the data, suggesting that officers and sergeants perceive mutual levels of overall trust, integrity, and competence in each other. Three hypotheses were supported by the data, suggesting that officers and sergeants perceive differences in consistency, loyalty, and openness. Recommendations include further analysis of the data and incorporation of the supported hypotheses into continuing education of police department personnel.

Key Words: Trust • officer-sergeant relationships • superior-subordinate relationships • integrity • consistency • competence • loyalty • openness

Trust is paramount to developing effective supervisor-subordinate relationships (Robbins, 2003). It is reported to be even more important in military and paramilitary organizations (Sweeney, 2007), including police departments. This study investigated perceived trust between police officers and sergeants in a western city. The literature review cites supervisor-subordinate relationships in law enforcement as well as non-law enforcement organizations.

Literature Review

What is trust?

Deutsch (1958) defines trust as follows:

An individual may be said to have trust in the occurrence of an event if he expects its occurrence and the expectations lead to behavior which he perceives to have greater negative motivational consequences if the expectation is not confirmed than positive motivational consequence if it is confirmed (p. 266).

T. Jacob Stull has served as a police officer in the Aurora (CO) Police Department since 2003; he also teaches criminal justice courses at the Community College of Aurora. Previously, he worked with incarcerated juveniles at the Santa Clara County Probation Department in California.

Stull

Boon and Holmes (1991) simplify that definition and define trust as having a positive expectation that another person won't act opportunistically or take advantage of you.

How do people communicate to gain trust? What behavior leads to the development of trust? Schindler and Thomas (1993) identify five components of trust, which this study uses. They state that for persons to instill a sense of trust in others, they must demonstrate integrity, competence, consistency, loyalty, and openness.

Integrity. Integrity means honesty and truthfulness. It is likely the most important dimension to someone who is deciding whether to trust another (Tan & Tan, 2000). Butler and Cantrell (1984) state, "without a perception of the other's 'moral character' and 'basic honesty,' other dimensions of trust were meaningless" (p. 20). Kouzes and Posner (1993) state, "Honesty is absolutely essential to leadership. If people are going to follow someone willingly, whether it be into battle or into the boardroom, they first want to assure themselves that the person is worthy of their trust" (p. 14).

Competence. Competence refers to a leader's technical and interpersonal knowledge and skills. Hogan and Warrenfeltz (2003) identify four broad categories of leader competencies: intrapersonal skills skills. Sweeney (2007) further defines these qualities. Intrapersonal skills include, interpersonal skills, business skills, and leadership regulating one's emotions, accommodating easily to authority, composure, self-control, and stress management. Interpersonal skills are the ability to build and maintain relationships; make a personal connection with others; and make an effort to learn about others, listen to their concerns, and understand their basic needs. Business skills are planning, budgeting, coordinating, and monitoring abilities. Some might equate business skills with a strong sense of duty, doing the right thing, and getting the job done. Leadership skills include building and guiding a high-performance team, confidence, and physical and moral courage.

Consistency. A trustworthy individual is reliable, is predictable, and uses good judgment in any situation. Such an individual elicits what researchers call knowledge-based trust (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996). Blanchard (2007) explains that trust occurs when leaders behave consistently with the values they profess. Leaders communicate their values and the organization's values to their team and then integrate those values into how the team operates. They also recognize and reward those who embody these values.

Loyalty. Loyalty is one's allegiance to others and willingness to protect them from unnecessary danger or undue criticism. If you trust that someone has your best interests in mind, you believe that person is loyal to you. When officers trust their sergeants, they are willing to be vulnerable to the sergeant's actions, believing the sergeant will protect

their rights and interests (Hosmer, 1995). For example, a sergeant who accepts the blame for something an officer did incorrectly because of faulty directions from the sergeant shows loyalty to the officer. Bolman & Deal (2006) state that leaders must defend the group and its way of life. The trust they engender as a result of their defense of the group is identification-based trust (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996).

Openness. Openness is providing someone with the full truth—sharing information openly (Blanchard, 2007). In a study of 12 manufacturing organizations, Stull (1978) found that supervisors and subordinates preferred a communication climate characterized by perceived openness to sending and receiving messages about task and non-task issues.

Schindler and Thomas (1993) created directional hypotheses regarding which components are most important to supervisors, subordinates, and peers. They based their predictions on the work of Schmidt & Posner (1982), which analyzed the qualities most admired in supervisors, subordinates, and peers. Schindler & Thomas' study concluded that whether the relationship was with a supervisor, a subordinate, or a peer, each person identified the order of importance of the components of trust, from most to least, as integrity, competence, loyalty, consistency, and openness.

Methods

This study used the following methodology to measure the perceived trust between sergeants and police officers in the police department of a western city:

Subjects. The subjects in this study were sergeants ($n = 19$) and police officers ($n = 50$).

Variables. The independent variable was position—sergeant or officer. The dependent variable was perceived trust.

Hypotheses. This study tested six hypotheses. Deferring Schindler and Thomas' (1993) hypotheses for future analysis, the researcher created the following *a priori*, non-directional hypotheses for this study:

- H₁ There will be differences in the reported mean scores of sergeants and officers regarding how much they trust each other.
- H₂ There will be differences in the reported mean scores of sergeants and officers regarding how much integrity they observe in each other.
- H₃ There will be differences in the reported mean scores of sergeants and officers regarding the competence level they observe in each other.

Stull

H₄ There will be differences in the reported mean scores of sergeants and officers regarding how much consistency they observe in each other's performance.

H₅ There will be differences in the reported mean scores of sergeants and officers regarding how much loyalty they perceive from each other.

H₆ There will be differences in the reported mean scores of sergeants and officers regarding how open they are with each other.

The null hypotheses are that there would be no differences between sergeants' and officers' perceptions.

Research Instruments

Two research instruments were created for this study, one tailored to sergeants and one to officers. Each comprised 25 items rated on a seven-point Likert-type scale along three dimensions: how often that behavior occurred between the sergeant and officer, how often the respondent wished it occurred, and how important the behavior was to the respondent (Porter, 1961). Five items were included to measure each component of trust; four were loaded positively, and one was loaded negatively for each item. The purpose of the negative loading was to determine whether respondents discriminated among items.

A sample openness item from the sergeant survey follows:

I am willing to listen to concerns about personal matters from my officers.

1. This how it is with my officers.
2. This is how I wish it were with my officers.
3. This is very important to me.

A sample loyalty item from the officer survey is:

My sergeant admits if he has done something wrong that has led to an officer making a mistake.

1. This is how it currently is with my sergeant.
2. This is how I wish it were with my sergeant.
3. This is very important to me.

Peers and teachers validated the surveys for content and grammatical correctness. They agreed that the purpose was to measure leadership.

Procedures

This study used 2 x 3 x 5 quasi-experimental research design. The researcher secured the appropriate protocol documents from the university and police department institutional

research boards. Participants were provided with an informed consent document, the appropriate survey, and response sheets; they were asked to complete the survey and return it to the researcher. A convenience sample was accepted in place of a random sample because of the nature of police work and the ability to recruit willing participants.

The data were subjected to SPSS *t*-tests to determine whether the mean scores between supervisors and subordinates were significantly different. Tests were applied to all six hypotheses, measures of desired trust, and measures of importance. Additional tests were used to compare existing with desired levels of overall trust. The researcher conducted a final test to determine whether participants discriminated between positively and negatively loaded survey items. Hypotheses were considered supported at the .05 level or lower.

Results

Comparisons of means for perceived overall trust, integrity, and competence indicated differences between sergeants and officers (Table 1); however, these data do not support rejecting the null hypotheses that there would not be statistically significant differences in the reported mean scores. The differences between the means on consistency, loyalty, and openness were statistically significant and supported rejecting the null hypotheses.

Table 1. Mean Scores for Perceptions of Sergeant-Officer Trust

Variable	Rank		<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>
	Officers	Sergeants		
All	5.6427 (48)	5.4333 (18)	1.062	.292
Integrity	5.6071 (49)	5.2632 (19)	1.583	.118
Competence	5.9082 (49)	5.8816 (19)	.110	.913
Consistency	5.8571 (49)	5.3421 (19)	2.856	.005
Loyalty	5.5000 (49)	6.2368 (19)	3.142	.003
Openness	5.4167 (48)	4.3750 (18)	4.178	.000

Note. The numbers in parentheses indicate the number of subjects (*n*) who responded to the respective items. Numbers differ within sample groups because some subjects inadvertently did not respond to every item.

Comparisons of means for desired levels of overall trust, integrity, competence, consistency, and openness indicated differences between sergeants and officers (Table 2); however, these differences were not significant. The difference between means on desired loyalty was statistically significant.

Table 2. Mean Scores for Perceptions of Sergeant-Officer Desired Levels of Trust

Variable	Rank		<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>
	Officers	Sergeants		
All	5.3052 (48)	5.2474 (19)	.852	.188
Integrity	5.2245 (49)	5.2763 (19)	.873	.161
Competence	5.4949 (49)	5.6974 (19)	.586	.547
Consistency	5.3469 (49)	4.8816 (19)	.177	1.365
Loyalty	4.6429 (49)	5.6974 (19)	3.780	.000
Openness	4.9479 (48)	4.6842 (19)	.896	.374

Note. The numbers in parentheses indicate the number of subjects (*n*) who responded to the respective items. Numbers differ within sample groups because some subjects inadvertently did not respond to every item.

Comparisons of scores on the importance of overall trust, integrity, competence, consistency, loyalty, and openness indicated differences between sergeants and officers (Table 3); however, the means were not statistically significant.

A further analysis confirmed that respondents discriminated among positively and negatively loaded items on the surveys ($p < .001$).

Discussion

This study provided no statistically significant support for three hypotheses related to trust between leaders and followers: perceptions of overall trust, integrity, and competence; however, it did provide statistically significant support related to three hypotheses: perceptions of consistency, loyalty, and openness.

Table 3. Mean Scores for Perceptions of Importance of Sergeant-Officer Trust

Variable	Rank		<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>
	Officers	Sergeants		
All	5.9010 (49)	5.9030 (19)	.015	.988
Integrity	5.6633 (49)	5.9342 (19)	1.462	.149
Competence	6.1888 (49)	6.3158 (19)	.775	.441
Consistency	6.0561 (49)	5.7237 (19)	1.686	.097
Loyalty	6.3112 (49)	6.4211 (19)	.726	.471
Openness	5.2857 (49)	5.3158 (19)	.145	.885

Note. The numbers in parentheses indicate the number of subjects (*n*) who responded to the respective items. Numbers differ within sample groups because some subjects inadvertently did not respond to every item.

Officers perceived sergeants as more consistent than sergeants perceived officers ($p < .01$). Sergeants perceived officers as more loyal than officers perceived sergeants ($p < .01$). Sergeants also expressed the wish that their officers were more loyal more often than officers expressed the same wish about their sergeants ($p < .001$). Officers perceived sergeants as more open than sergeants perceived officers ($p < .001$).

Schindler and Thomas (1993) found no differences between supervisor-subordinate pairs on the importance of integrity, competence, loyalty, consistency, or openness; this study found similar results. However, while this study used different measurement instruments, the outcome did not match Schindler and Thomas' study in terms of order of importance of the components of trust. Schindler and Thomas found that all groups ranked the components, in order of most important to least important, as integrity, competence, loyalty, consistency, and openness. In this study, the order was loyalty, competence, integrity, consistency, and openness for sergeants; for officers, it was loyalty, competence, consistency, integrity, and openness. These differences could be due to the nature of police versus business responsibilities. It can also be attributed to the different methodologies these studies employed. This study also came to different conclusions regarding the order of importance of components than studies by Butler & Cantrell (1984) and Schmidt & Posner (1982). Butler and Cantrell argue that loyalty is

Stull

more important for trust in supervisors than for trust in subordinates. Schmidt and Posner argue that loyalty is most important for trust in subordinates and less important for trust in supervisors. This study ranked loyalty as most important for both groups.

Applications of the Study

The results of this and similar studies can be applied to training programs, emphasizing the importance of establishing trust between officers and sergeants and providing suggestions for how to develop such trust. Consultants might help to uncover reasons for differences in perceptions of trust and ways to deal with them. Some of the findings may merely emphasize what might be expected behavior in organizational culture.

Consistency. From leader-member exchange theory, we are reminded that, inadvertently, leaders often create in-groups and out-groups. This leads to a lack of consistency in how people are treated. Leadership training should highlight this tendency and caution leaders about the consequences of this occurrence. Sergeants actually scored lower on the consistency measure than officers, suggesting they see officers as less consistent. While most of the items' mean scores were in the 5 and 6 ranges, one item's mean score was 4.1579: item 28 asked sergeants whether officers follow the book when handling situations. This particular item may have received this lower score not so much because sergeants don't trust their officers to follow the book, but because sergeants realize from their own experience that different situations may lead to different interpretations of "the book." Another possible reason for this lower mean score could be that sergeants oversee numerous officers, and they may take into account isolated incidents of inconsistent behavior. One sergeant actually reported to the researcher, "I trust my officers until they [screw] up, then I don't trust them anymore." This statement offers an example of deterrence-based trust, where one violation or inconsistency can destroy the relationship (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996).

Loyalty. How do sergeants show the same loyalty to their officers that they show to their own superiors? How do officers react when they know their sergeants' loyalty is directed upward in the organization? Sergeants actually scored officers as more loyal than officers scored sergeants. Officers' mean scores for every positively loaded item were in the 5 range; the lowest was 5.2041 for an item that read "My supervisor motivates me to achieve and grow within the department." While this result is still positive, perhaps this is an area on which leadership training for sergeants could focus. Transformational leadership might work best in this situation, with sergeants inspiring officers to maximize their potential and improve, and superiors promoting within the department. Leadership training

should also emphasize the need for sergeants to demonstrate loyalty to officers and, perhaps, camouflage their loyalty to superiors.

Openness. Does a supervisor really expect officers to be completely open when filing reports of criminal incidents, particularly if the supervisor served on the streets for some time? Do officers expect sergeants to be completely open with them about everything? Some information is confidential, and some is personal. Some sergeants might not want to talk about personal issues with their officers. In fact, this was the lowest scoring item from officers about their sergeants. Item 7—"My supervisor talks openly with me about his personal matters"—had a mean score of 3.8400. Sergeants showed a mean score of 2.5263 on item 4—"I feel free to talk only about task-related matters with my officers." This item's wording was overlooked during preparation of the survey. The word "only" should not have been included and actually loads the question negatively. Sergeants showed a mean score of 2.7638 on item 22—"I feel free to talk with my officers about my own personal matters." The general literature on openness encourages disclosure of information, but full disclosure may not be appropriate or comfortable for everyone. The professional work environment of a specific department may not encourage true openness between sergeants and officers due to the paramilitary hierarchy. However, training on how to handle various situations might arm officers and sergeants with appropriate responses when personal matters arise that still can lead to creating understanding and a supportive climate for openness.

Raising these topics during training would promote discussion and awareness among both officers and sergeants regarding issues of trust. For example, asking officers to define concepts such as consistency, loyalty, and openness during their in-service workshops then passing this information along to sergeants in leadership training would be a first step to improving officer-sergeant relationships. Another step would be to clarify expectations sergeants and officers have of each other and to define how to meet those expectations. Implementing positive change based on this feedback would be the ultimate goal in improving trust between sergeants and officers. Ongoing monitoring and feedback on the effectiveness of these efforts would be essential to this process.

Future Research

This study asked sergeants and officers to share their perceptions of each other regarding trust. Future studies might take on different characteristics. Greguras & Ford (2006) suggest developing separate measurement criteria for supervisors and subordinates

because each group may have differing perceptions of relationships and what is important in terms of integrity, competence, consistency, loyalty, and openness.

Lewicki, Tomlinson, and Gillespie (2006) point out that most studies measure trust at a given point in time. During this study, this researcher received comments from several officers suggesting a negative relationship with their sergeants. A recurring comment was along the lines of, "You want me to take this survey now? My sergeant is a [jerk]." These kinds of reactions are frequently temporary until an issue is resolved. Lewicki et al. suggest longitudinal studies might focus on measuring the *development* of trust over a period of time.

Data collection could include open-ended, in-depth responses that might reveal more than just interval data. Emotions and actual behavior might emerge through this technique. Interviews and observational studies might lead to more profound results.

An item-by-item analysis could be performed on the frequency distribution, standard deviations, and variations this study captured. Each item has meaning and could lead to valuable information. For example, a mean of 5.00 on an item might be the result of most answers hovering between 4 and 6, or it may be the result of answers scattered all over the scale. What can be attributed to the reason for a minimum score of 6 and a maximum score of 7 on supervisor's item 19—"I always have the best interest of my subordinates in mind?" Why do subordinates score a minimum of 1 and a maximum of 7 on item 4—"My supervisor admits when he has done something wrong that has led to a subordinate making a mistake"? The differences may tell a story.

More discrete items could be created to measure each component of trust. The instruments could be validated more thoroughly. During the validation process, raters could assign each item to one of the components of trust and an inter-rater reliability coefficient calculated to strengthen the integrity of the instruments.

The methodology could be tighter, perhaps executed in concert with other researchers with more experience and expertise in research methods.

Finally, a broader sample could be studied that includes more officers and sergeants from a variety of organizations and departments.

The department in this study appears to be healthy in terms of the amount of trust officers and sergeants report. All the means were on the positive side of the scale, except, of course, for the negatively loaded ones. Even the differences between means on consistency, loyalty, and openness were on the positive side.

Trust between sergeants and officers is necessary. The level of trust depends on personalities, stress levels of the job, organizational politics, and other factors. Expecting total trust might be too idealistic. However, for teams to perform well, people need to be able to count on each other. It is particularly important for police officials to work on

developing trust between sergeants and officers in their departments, where the difference is not measured in profits (as in business organizations) but in people's lives and public safety.

Note

1. This article is based on a master's thesis the researcher completed at Kaplan University under the supervision of Dr. Cliff Roberson.

References

- Blanchard, K. (2007). *Leading at a higher level: Blanchard on leadership and creating high performing organizations*. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Bolman, L. G., & Deal, T. E. (2006). *The wizard and the warrior: Leading with passion and power*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- Boon, S. D., & Holmes, J. G. (1991). The dynamics of interpersonal trust: Resolving uncertainty in the face of risk. In R. A. Hinde and J. Groebel (Eds.), *Cooperation and prosocial behavior* (pp. 190–211). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Butler, J. K., Jr., & Cantrell, R. S. (1984). A behavioral decision theory approach to modeling dyadic trust in superiors and subordinates. *Psychological Reports*, 55, 19–28.
- Deutsch, M. (1958). Trust and suspicion. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 2, 265–279.
- Greguras, G. J., & Ford, J. M. (2006). An examination of the multidimensionality of supervisor and subordinate perceptions of leader-member exchange. *Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology*, 79, 433–465.
- Hogan, R., & Warrenfeltz, R. (2003). Educating the modern manager. *Academy of Management Learning and Education*, 2, 74–84.
- Hosmer, L. T. (1995). Trust: The connecting link between organizational theory and philosophical ethics. *Academy of Management Review*, 20, 379–404.
- Kouzes, J. M., & Posner, B. Z. (1993). *Credibility: How leaders gain and lose it and why people demand it*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- Lewicki, R. J., & Bunker, B. B. (1996). Developing and maintaining trust in work relationships. In R. J. Kramer & T. Tyler (Eds.), *Trust in organizations: Frontiers of theory and research* (pp. 114–139). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Stull

- Lewicki, R. J., Tomlinson, E. C., & Gillespie, N. (2006). Models of interpersonal trust development: Theoretical approaches, empirical evidence, and future directions. *Journal of Management, 32*, 991–1022.
- Porter, L.W. (1961). A study of perceived need satisfaction in bottom and middle management jobs. *Journal of Applied Psychology, 45*, 1–10.
- Robbins, S. P. (2003). *Organizational behavior* (10th ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson/Prentice Hall.
- Schindler, P. L., & Thomas, C. C. (1993). The structure of interpersonal trust in the workplace. *Psychological Reports, 73*, 563–573.
- Schmidt, W., H., & Posner, B. Z. (1982). *Managerial values and expectations: The silent power in personal and organizational life*. New York: American Management Association.
- Stull, J. B. (1978). Rewards for openness. *Journal of Communication, 28*, 124–129.
- Stull, T. J. (2008) Trust in supervisor-subordinate relationships in a Western police department: A quasi-experimental field study. Unpublished master's thesis, Kaplan University.
- Sweeney, P. J. (2007). Trust: The key to combat leadership. In D. Crandall (Ed.), *Leadership lessons from West Point* (pp. 252–277). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- Tan, H. H., & Tan, C. S. F. (2000). Toward the differentiation of trust in supervisor and trust in organization. *Genetic, Social, and General Psychology Monographs, 126*, 241–260.

A Jail Guru Reminisces

Ken Kerle

[Editor's Note: In March 2009, Ken Kerle, the founding editor of American Jails magazine retired. This is the second part of a two-part article by Ken in which he discusses his career as editor of American Jails. The first part of the article appeared in the Spring 2009 Issue of PICJ.]

A Fire Trap Jail

Odysseys bring fun and enlightenment and, at times, challenges that one would normally avoid. My friend, Dick Ford, then sheriff of Washington County, Maryland, suggested that as I had traveled the world examining penal institutions, I should now focus on American jails. First, some background. Dick previously had provided me the opportunity to work in the Washington County Detention Center in Hagerstown as a jail officer. The jail was a fire trap—the building was an 1857 institution where some of the jail cells were padlocked because the locking mechanisms were in a state of dysfunction. The sheriff asked for money to make the repairs from the five-member board of county commissioners. He was turned down. A fire hazard issue where lives could be lost in the event of a conflagration cannot be ignored, so the sheriff contacted the state fire marshal. The marshal made it crystal clear to the county board that jail repairs had to be made or the county would suffer the consequences. The repairs were made.

The Jail Odyssey Begins: Jail Numbers and Challenges

My first jail visit in March of 1978 outside of Maryland required a short trip across the Potomac River into the neighboring state of West Virginia. The Jefferson County Jail in Charles Town, built in the 1920s, looked its age. In the early 1980s, I audited this jail as a member of a two-man team for the National Sheriffs' Association. These jail audits were financed by federal money from the National Jail Center, which at that time, if I remember correctly, was in Boulder, Colorado. However, on that windy March day, two years before the audit, I was an inexperienced jail visitor, although I had toured a number of prisons in the United States, Europe, and the Far East.

Many readers are often confused about the differences between jails and prisons because some in the media still use these terms interchangeably. One significant difference between jails and prison is the numbers. In 2008, more than 650,000 people were released from state and federal prisons from a prison population of more than 2 million people incarcerated at the state and federal levels. In one year, however, the 3,000-plus

Kerle

jails of the country will book in and release around 25 million people—roughly the populations of Illinois and Ohio combined. Keep in mind that people brought to jail are still in a pretrial status and presumed innocent as they have not been sentenced. Also, many people found guilty will do their time in jail, especially if they have shorter sentences. Back in 1997 a press release issued by the U.S. Department of Justice stated that there were almost 30 times as many admissions to local jails as there were new court commitments to state and federal prisons (Kerle, Kenneth E., *Exploring Jail Operations*, 2003, American Jail Association, page vii). Even though many of these individuals get released from jails (perhaps 60% to 70%) in the first 48 hours, jail staff who work the jail booking section in the large mega jails observe huge numbers of alleged law violators arrested. Sickness, mental illness, and alcohol and drug problems contaminate a majority of those ushered into the jail facility. A hardcore segment of this jail population will return to the facility again and again after release. These individuals are called “frequent flyers.” Senior jail staff tell stories about certain prisoners who experience booking and rebooking several times during a calendar year. For a significant number, jail becomes the home away from home or, in many instances, the street, as a good many inmates are homeless. Over a five- or ten-year period, one individual may achieve double-digit booking figures. Dare I suggest that the inmate who scores the highest in yearly bookings deserves mention in the *Guinness Book of Records*!

How Did He Kill Himself?

At the Jefferson County West Virginia jail, the aforementioned first jail visit, I asked and received a complete tour of this old and worn-out institution. The sheriff accompanied me on the tour. The jail at that time had perhaps fewer than 30 people. Crowding was not a problem.

We stopped in front of one empty cell and the sheriff asked me to enter the dark cell. I did. He then closed the door on me. The cell had no lighting and so inside it was pitch dark. The sheriff opened the food slot in the door where meals were passed through to the inmate and I heard him say, “A person killed himself in this cell recently. Can you tell me how he did it?”

Sitting on the cement floor of the cell I pondered the question. Several improbable ways came to mind, but I discarded them. The sheriff then explained: “This guy came in drunk and the staff placed him in the cell. He was in here for several days since he couldn’t make a money bond. One day the officer delivered his lunch on a metal tray, sliding it through the food slot. About an hour later the officer returned to retrieve the tray. There was no response. The officer called for support, and two staff with great effort managed to pull the door open.”

On the floor of the cell they found the man dead with shoelaces wrapped tightly around his neck and the ends of the laces secured to the food slot knob, which served the inmate's objective. After he had wound the laces around his neck, he merely tied his shoelaces to the knob and sank to the floor. This maneuver curtailed his breathing and snuffed out his life.

Insufficient staff preclude placing jail officers into eyeball to eyeball contact with all inmates labeled suicide risks 24 hours a day. A nurse in the Mobile County, Alabama, jail developed a program whereby the inmates assumed the role of watching those inclined to take their lives. This worked and the jail experienced a significant decline in suicides (Manning, Rhoda, "A Suicide Prevention Program that Really Works," *American Jails*, Spring, 1989). However, this solution has its limits. In a visit to the Polk County, Iowa, jail, I was impressed by the progress made in Iowa's largest jail. Jail officers received a 5% higher salary than the road patrol, and they were issued special T-shirts made especially for jail staff. These were actions introduced by the sheriff and the jail administrator to stem the "hemorrhaging" of jail staff that would stay a month and then quit. Crowding caused some cells to have two or three inmates. In one cell an inmate committed suicide by hanging himself in front of two other inmates. The explanation from these two for not sounding the alarm was the comment, "Well, we guessed he knew what he wanted to do."

Jail Training and Lack of Staff

Training for jail officers was nonexistent in that West Virginia jail back in 1978. Staff had received no instructions when persons were booked in other than to lock them down in their street clothes. Today, most jail populations in the larger jails in this country get issued jail uniforms at booking, and their clothes are washed and stored to be returned upon release or turned over to the inmate's family during a visit. Mental health screening questions on the booking form are part of the screening process in many 21st century jails. Training takes on more importance today than 30 years ago due to possible lawsuits, although there still remain a dozen states where the jail training is not mandated (see *Who's Who in Jail Management* (5th ed.), 2007, American Jail Association, pages 568–571).

Many of the larger jails in states where jail training is not mandated organize and operate their own jail training academies in part to guard against possible lawsuits charging failure to train. Suicide prevention training becomes a high priority. Smart jail staff understand training has to be repeated over and over or what is taught becomes only a faint memory. Yet it is well to remember that about a dozen states offer no training at all. Often, small jails in rural communities get by with a person who works in the jail functioning as a field training officer.

Kentucky, the only state in the union with an elected jailer, holds an annual 40-hour training conference where jail administrators meet to get updated on the latest changes affecting jails. When I visited this conference back in the 1990s, each jailer received a \$3,000 stipend for attending the training. Kentucky, like some other states, eliminated some of the smaller jails and reclassified them as holding facilities. It would take an amendment to the Kentucky state constitution to get rid of the elected jailers in these small populated counties, and citizens seemed not disposed to do so.

The most impressive jail training I observed was in Florida in the mid 1990s where jail staff in Miami-Dade County got five months of training with no guarantee of a job. Florida, like North Carolina, does a lot of its training on community college campuses and uses a good mix of jail training staff and academics to do the training. But training gets overlooked, ignored, or downgraded in more jurisdictions than I would care to mention. According to Christine Tartaro, the national average for local police training is 1,100 hours—almost seven months. Yet, a third of those who responded to a direct supervision survey she conducted indicate that they received less than a quarter of the training police recruits receive (Tartaro, Christine, "Jails and Academe Column-Survey; Direct Supervision Jails," *American Jails*, May/June 2003, pages 77–79). Without a concerted commitment to training, you can't make a direct supervision jail function as it should with a minimum of violence and stress.

Regional Jail Authority and Regional Jails

Readers should be aware that the West Virginia state government finally took decisive action when the legislature enacted the West Virginia Regional Jail Authority operated by the state. The Eastern Regional Jail in Martinsburg, West Virginia, opened in the late 1980s. By the end of 2005, this regional jail authority had 10 regional jails to service the 55 counties (*Who's Who in Jail Management* (5th ed.), American Jail Association, 2007, pages 431–433; also see Parsons, Larry F., "The Regionalization of West Virginia Jails," *American Jails*, Jul./Aug. 1994, page 51). The regional jail authority takes responsibility for training the jail staff and for inspecting the jails. When I visited the Eastern Regional Jail in Martinsburg, I observed the officers outside of the pod staring in at the inmates inside the pod. Obviously there was no commitment to the philosophy of direct supervision where officers are stationed inside the pods with the inmates.

Regional jails exist in many other states such as Virginia, Ohio, Kansas, Nebraska, Illinois, Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota, Kentucky, Idaho, Washington, North Carolina, Georgia (Kerle, Kenneth E., "Jail Evolution: Rated Capacities (RC), Regional Jails, City Jails, The Growing Number of Women Jail Administrators and New Jail Construction and Planning New Jails," *American Jails*, May/June 2004, page 19).

Five states adopted the recommendation of the Wickersham Commission, which said back in 1931 that the states should take the responsibility for running their own jails. Wickersham was the Attorney General of the U.S. appointed by President Herbert Hoover who directed an exhaustive study of jails and lockups. It would be a euphemism to say that this study found jails to be in bad shape when, in fact, they were in horrible shape—so much so that the recommendation declared that the states should operate them. After all, jails are a state responsibility. The basis for state control can be found in state statutes and state constitutions. Counties are only administrative units of the state and could be abolished tomorrow if that were the will of the state legislatures and governors.

Only five states today have state jail systems (Connecticut, Rhode Island, Vermont, Delaware, Hawaii, and Alaska). To understand why each of these states adopted the Wickersham Commission suggestion, it is necessary to explore the history and politics of these states that led to state-operated jails. Back in 1994 *American Jails* magazine published an article by Nancy E. Schafer of the University of Alaska at Anchorage, "State-Operated Jails: How and Why," which describes well how it occurred (*American Jails*, Sep./Oct. 1994, page 35). One will discover on reading this well-researched and insightful article that each of the five states achieved state control of their jail systems differently. Never assume that states are in lockstep over state control of jails.

Trusting to Camera Observation

Visiting jails around the country, I found staffing remains a big issue. Why? Perhaps 75% to 80% of a jail budget is appropriated for staffing. Is it any wonder that staffing remains a perennial problem with elected officials trying to please the taxpayers? This was cited as the number one problem back when Dick Ford and I produced *The State of Our Nation's Jails 1982* for the National Sheriffs' Association. More than 2,600 jails were surveyed, and the answers indicated that staffing bugged people more than anything else. In my opinion, budget-cutting politicians downgraded the jail operation as to its importance in the political scheme of things, and so jail staffing continually got short shrift. To compensate for staff shortages, the easy solution was to install a camera on a cell block or in a cell where an officer could observe what was going on from his/her vantage point in the control room.

Cameras lead people to conclude mistakenly that an officer can see everything from the jail control room. While I watched the monitor, an inmate wrapped a sheet around his neck in an upstate New York jail. The officer on duty was momentarily distracted by a phone call. When I pointed to the camera monitor, he radioed jail staff to converge on the cell and interrupt the suicide.

Kerle

In a small jail in the northern panhandle of West Virginia, inmates failed in their efforts to signal an escape because they could not get the attention of the officer in the control room responsible for camera observation. I later learned other chores made constant camera observation highly unlikely. As a result she did not see the inmates frantically waving their hands through the cell bars to indicate an escape in progress since she did not remain focused on the camera image. She had a radio to man and phone calls to answer. Like other humans she did not have eyes in the back of her head.

My own personal conclusion is “*Don’t trust a camera to do your job,*” despite what election officials may think. There are often too many distractions where one’s focus on the camera image is lost. Cameras are handy devices and are extremely useful in jails. However, county elected officials who control jail budgets are wrong in assuming you get a better value with more cameras in the jail compared with employing the proper amount of correctional staff. There is no substitute for a trained jail officer who makes frequent contact with the inmates if the prime objective is to operate a safe and secure jail free of jail suicides and escapes.

Too many jails, especially smaller-populated facilities, suffer when ignorant county officials overlook the value of well-paid and well-trained jail officers. This takes on larger importance today with the advent of direct supervision jails where the officer remains in the dayroom area with the inmates under supervision.

Pay Parity for Jail Staff

At the end of 2006, December 31st, I visited a Wyoming jail not far from the Yellowstone National Park with a rated capacity of 45, which means this small institution had 45 beds. The jail administrator told me it took him two years of effort to convince the county elected board to grant jail staff pay parity with the road patrol. People would not take the jail career seriously as long as wage stagnated in the minimum wage range. County board members took two years to absorb this information and act on it. Once pay parity became a reality, job turnover became a thing of the past for this jail. In too many jails, especially the smaller ones with a rated capacity of less than 50, minimum wage for the jail proved to be the prevailing wage. Many people took these jobs because nothing else was available in the community. A move in the direction of regionalization is one way to improve jail staff conditions and wages.

Mental Health and Co-Occurring Disorders: Reentry Challenges

Unless they work in jails, most citizens would not be aware that jails have become the largest repositories for the mentally ill. The largest mental health institution in the United States today is the Los Angeles County Jail system where many inmates are housed in

the Twin Towers facility—sometimes referred to as the towers of the “mad and the bad.” This jail, built in 1997, has a rated capacity of 3,647 and is the newest of the six facilities the Los Angeles County jail system comprises. The Twin Towers facility that I visited in May 2007 is connected by tunnel to the LA County Men’s Central Jail constructed in 1963 with a rated capacity today of 6,472. This is considerably fewer than the nearly 8,000 people confined there when I first looked at the Los Angeles jail system in 1988. At that time, the L.A. jail system population had jumped to almost 30,000, but due to court orders and alternative punishment schemes, it had declined to below 20,000 when I made the last of my four visits back in 2007. Still it remains the largest jail system in the United States.

On this last visit I had the opportunity to discuss jail problems with program staff in the L.A. jail system, some of whom were familiar with the mental health treatment in the “mad” tower. Mental health staff backed by well-trained officers did an excellent job managing these unfortunate individuals. One must keep in mind that mentally ill individuals incarcerated in jails frequently have alcohol and drug problems on top of the mental illness. My wife and I stayed at the Checkers Hotel in downtown L.A., and as we walked about the streets, we observed a good many homeless persons who appeared to be afflicted with drug and alcohol and mental health problems.

Karen Dalton, Director of Programs, L.A. County Jail system, indicated that the L.A. County Sheriff’s Department had identified several sites in Los Angeles County suitable for halfway house treatment centers, which could more effectively help the mentally disturbed with treatment programs for mental illness and alcohol and drug problems. In every instance, she reported, the neighborhood dwellers had organized opposition to erecting such centers in the vicinity of their neighborhoods, and the proposed dwellings were discarded. I had run into the problem before in communities throughout the country where citizens had opposed the construction of a new jail facility. This is commonly referred to as the NIMBY (Not in My Backyard) syndrome.

The NIMBY syndrome exists in other countries. While visiting prisons in the U.K., I recall a halfway house in London that operated out of a middle class neighborhood. The NIMBY factor was confronted by the Home Office (in charge of prisons), which sent staff into the neighborhood in question six months before the house was to open. Staff told neighbors what they proposed to do and when they wanted to do it and encouraged the citizens to become involved. They invited neighbors into the halfway facility on its opening day and got them acquainted with the staff and inmate residents. These efforts stopped the rumors and fear mongering that can occur when officials discuss placing an institution or treatment center in a neighborhood.

Reentry: Success or Failure

Whether a jail sentence can dissuade a person from reverting to criminal behavior is problematic. A jail sentence followed by release back into the community needs people to accept the community challenge of keeping people out of jail. This eludes many communities and the in-and out-of jail syndrome drags on and on and on.

First of all, the community is generally ill-informed about the jail, the prisoners who occupy it, and the staff who work in the jail and what they do. Until communities begin to understand the need for an active public responsibility in regard to jail operations, one concludes that only minimal progress will occur at a glacial pace as the jails continue to grow in number and size.

From my vantage point, I would like to see jail officers have college and university credentials to attest to their ability to complete a course of study worthy of a degree in higher education. Historically, this has not been the case because too many counties were satisfied with hiring students fresh out of high schools as jail officers. When I was first introduced to the corrections field back in 1970, even a high school diploma was not required to work in most jails, but the lawsuit phenomenon pushed states into mandating a high school degree for a jail position. Formal education is a part of the triangle that I label with the acronym FEGTRE (Formal Education, Good Training, and Requisite Experience). I don't believe it necessary to have a criminal justice degree to qualify as a competent jail officer. My belief about a good education is that it compels you to reflect and think and figure out answers to life's many problems. Jails that get shortchanged by county elected bodies who allow recruiting of people right out of high school to be jail officers suffer from this mistake. These young people are apprentices who have not been seasoned by experience, which makes them more vulnerable to the ploys of "street smart" inmates they are supposed to supervise.

The Failure to Realize the Importance of Direct Supervision

Direct supervision started at the county level with the opening of the Contra Costa County Jail, California, back in 1981, 38 years ago. Direct supervision began in 1975 with the Federal Bureau of Prisons constructing three direct supervision jails in Chicago, New York City, and San Diego to house federal prisoners and to operate these jails on the philosophy of direct supervision. What this amounts to is having the officers inside the pods with the inmates where they could directly supervise them based on eight philosophical principles. A ninth principle, ownership of operation, came later. Direct supervision operated on the overall premise that people brought to jail were expected to behave similarly to other law abiding citizens in the community. To further emphasize the importance of these behavioral expectations, the architecture and physical plant had to

have aspects of the free world. Thus, instead of combination stainless steel toilet/wash-basins in the jail cells, the toilets and sinks could be made of porcelain and the furniture could be constructed of plastic, light and movable. This thinking alarmed people who people who believed the inmate dayrooms should have stainless steel picnic tables bolted to the floors with metal stools surrounding these table pushed into hardened concrete.

In 2001, the National Institute of Corrections Jail Center issued a *Directory of Direct Supervision Jails*. This document was based on a survey, and NIC made no claim as to the accuracy of those who claimed to adhere to direct supervision. What I've seen across the country of the direct supervision management of jails leads me to believe that the majority of these jails do not spend the requisite amount of time on staff training, that most of the officers could not tell you what the nine philosophical principles of direct supervision are, and that many jails overlook the necessity of making the jail environment as normal as possible. In short, replace the stainless steel with functional plastic furniture and porcelain toilet/washbasins. Many of these so-called direct supervision jails place much emphasis on heavy functional security. Single cells for the occupants have been superseded by two men in a cell and in some instances three men in a cell (Tartaro, Christine, "Survey: Direct Supervision," *American Jails*, May/June 2003; Tartaro, Christine, "Suicide and New Generation Jails," *American Jails*, Sept./Oct. 2003, page 37).

The usual answer as to why the jails do not stick to the direct supervision formula got down to "the elected county board was afraid it wouldn't work." The solution to a truly direct supervision buy-in means educating the public to the point that they at least accept the original concepts of direct supervision. This means changing the attitudes of a great many people who work in criminal justice agencies, jails, courts, police departments, and community corrections. Most have only the foggiest notion of what direct supervision is all about and what the implications are. One jail that I visited in Montgomery County, Maryland, exhibited the benefit to the public when all the criminal justice and ancillary agencies were committed to working with inmates with alcohol/drug and mental health problems, lack of education, insufficient job skills, and so on. It took two years of regular discussions and meetings to get to this point, but they succeeded, and the county became the first in the country to develop an inmate release card. The card entitled the released inmate free public bus transportation for the first 60 days and access to any public library in the county to check out information on housing and job opportunities.

Years before this transpired the seeds had been planted. When I taught college-level courses in several of Maryland's prisons, inmate students would tell me about Montgomery County and the fact the county had faculty from the college teaching in the jail. Of course, I took this with a grain of salt until I visited the jail and found it to be true. One person was a journalism professor who helped the inmates develop and write the county jail's newspaper.

Conclusion

When I reflect back on the past 38 years that I have been involved with jails and prisons, a lot gets overlooked or forgotten. I have written two books about jails (*American Jails: Looking to the Future*, Butterworth-Heinemann, Boston, MA, 1998, and *Exploring Jail Operations*, American Jail Association, Hagerstown, MD, 2003) and edited the first 120 issues of *American Jails* magazine with more than 2,000 articles. Yet, it just seems to me to skim the surface of the challenge.

Progress, of course, has been made in the world of jails, but I believe most of it occurred because courts forced local and state government to stop violating the rights of people incarcerated. This, of course, happened when the U.S. Supreme Court decided that inmates were no longer wards of the state devoid of all rights. I feel it incumbent upon myself to continue to educate people about jails through writing and public speaking, and I encourage people who think they might have an interest in local corrections to stay in touch.

Ken Kerle, Ph.D.
ken.kerle@cox.net
785-408-5618

Index

- Alaska, state jail system, 75
- Arkansas, three-strikes law, 16

- Ballasiotes, Diane, 11
- Bratton, William, 30

- California
 - police officers assaulted, 12–13, 14, 15
 - three-strikes legislation, 10, 11, 12, 13–14, 16
- Civilian Complaint Review Board (See New York City Civilian Complaint Review Board.)
- Colorado, three-strikes law, 16
- Community Capacity Development Office, 27, 29
- Community oriented policing, 27–41
 - defined, 30
 - effect on crime reduction program, 27–41
 - measures of success, 39
 - philosophy/tenets, 29, 30
- Compstat, 30, 31, 33, 37, 38
- Connecticut
 - state jail system, 75
 - three-strikes law, 16
- Contra Costa County (California) Jail, 78
- Corrections staff, 43–57, 73–74, 75–76
 - education, 45, 47, 49, 51, 59, 78
 - efficacy, 48, 51–55
 - pay, 43, 46, 47, 48, 49, 51–52, 53, 76
 - perceptions of, 43–57
 - training (or lack of), 43, 48, 49, 73–74
 - turnover, 43–57 (See also Turnover, reasons for.)
- Crime. (See Neighborhood crime.)
- Crime legislation. (See Three-strikes laws.)
- Court trials, 9

- Davis, Richard Allen, 11
- Delaware, state jail system, 75
- Department of Corrections, 46, 47, 49, 51
- Department of Justice, 27, 28, 29, 39, 72
- Diallo, Amadou, 31
- Dorismond, Patrick, 31
- Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), 28
- Drug-related crimes, 12

- Eastern Regional Jail (West Virginia), 74

- Federal Bureau of Prisons, 78
- Felons, 9, 11, 24
- Felony crimes, 11, 12
- Florida
 - corrections staff training, 74
 - three-strikes law, 12, 16
- Ford, Francis R “Dick,” 71, 75

- Georgia
 - regional jails in, 74
 - three-strikes law, 16
- Guiliani, Rudolph, 30

- Hawaii, state jail system, 75
- Homicide(s), 9
 - civilian, 16–17, 21, 22
 - correlates of, 13
 - police, 9–26

- Idaho, regional jails, 74
- Illinois, regional jails, 74
- Indiana, three-strikes law, 12, 16
- Inmates, jails/prison
 - direct supervision of, 78–79
 - drug/alcohol problems, 77
 - education, 79
 - job skills, 79
 - mental health problems, 76–77
 - reentry into society, 78
 - suicide/suicide prevention, 72–73, 75–76

Index

- Jails/Prisons, 71–80 (*See also* Corrections staff.)
 - community involvement/
 - understanding, 76–78
 - direct supervision in, 78–79
 - overcrowding, 9
 - populations, 71–72, 76–77
 - use of cameras in, 75–76
- Jefferson County (West Virginia) Jail, 71
- Job satisfaction, among correctional personnel, 45–46, 47, 48, 49 (*See also* Corrections staff; Turnover, reasons for.)

- Kane, Gene, Jr., 11
- Kansas,
 - regional jails in, 74
 - three-strikes law, 16
- Kentucky, 74
- Klaas, Polly, 11

- Law Enforcement Officers Killed or Assaulted (LEOKA), 9, 15, 16
- Life in prison, 9, 11, 23, 24
- Los Angeles County Jail system, 76–77
- Louima, Abner, 31
- Louisiana, three-strikes law, 12, 16

- Maryland, three-strikes law, 16
- Miami-Dade County (Florida), 74
- Minnesota, regional jails, 74
- Mobile County (Alabama) Jail, 73
- Montgomery County (Maryland) Jail, 79
- Montana, three-strikes law, 16

- National Institute of Corrections Jail Center, 79
- National Jail Center, 71
- National Sheriffs' Association, 71, 75
- Nebraska, regional jails, 74
- Neighborhood crime, 27–41
 - rates, 29, 37–38 (*See also* Compstat.)
 - residents' fear of, 29, 34, 38
 - residents' perception of, 34, 37–38
- Nevada, three-strikes law, 16
- New Jersey, three-strikes law, 16

- New Mexico, three-strikes law, 16
- New York City, 27–41, 78
- New York City Civilian Complaint Review Board (CCRB), 31–32, 40
- New York City Housing Authority, 33–34
- New York City Police Department (NYPD), 29, 30, 31–32, 33, 34–35, 36–40
- North Carolina
 - corrections staff training, 74
 - regional jails in, 74
 - three-strikes law, 16
- North Dakota
 - regional jails in, 74
 - three-strikes law, 16

- Ohio, regional jails, 74

- Parolees (*See* Felons.)
- Pennsylvania, three-strikes law, 16
- Police, abuse allegations, 31–32, 40 (*See also* New York City Civilian Complaint Review Board.)
- Police-community relations, 29, 30, 31–32, 36–40
- Police departments, citizens' view of crime reporting, 37–38
 - satisfaction with, 34–35, 36
 - treatment of citizenry, 31–32, 40
- Police departments, trust within, 59–70
- Police officer(s)
 - competence, 59, 60, 61, 63, 64, 65, 68
 - consistency, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68
 - integrity, 59, 60, 61, 63, 64, 65, 68
 - loyalty, 59, 60–61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68
 - openness, 59, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 67, 68
 - perceptions of trust among, 59–70
 - training, 66, 67
- Polk County (Iowa) Jail, 73
- Prison(s) (*See* Jails/Prisons.)
- Prison staff (*See* Corrections staff.)

- Queens County, NY, 32

- Queens County District Attorney, 33, 34–35, 36
- Regional jail authority/jails, 74–75
- Reynolds, Kimberly, 11
- Reynolds, Mike, 11
- Rhode Island, state jail system, 75
- Sentencing, prison, 9, 12, 24, 78 (See also Life in prison.)
- South Carolina, three-strikes law, 12, 16
- South Dakota, regional jails, 74
- Suicide. (See Inmates, jails/prison.)
- Tennessee, three-strikes law, 16
- Three-strikes laws, 9–26
- Trust
 - defined, 59–60
 - in supervisor-subordinate relationships, 59–70
- Turnover, corrections staff, 43–57
 - actual, 44–45
 - intentions, 44, 45, 46, 47, 49–52, 53, 55
 - involuntary, 44
 - psychological, 46
 - rates, 44, 51
 - voluntary, 44, 45
- Turnover, reasons for, 43–57
 - economics, 43, 46, 47, 48, 49, 51–52, 53
 - devalued feelings, 43, 48, 49, 51, 52, 53, 55
 - interpersonal conflicts, 43, 47, 48, 52, 53
 - job satisfaction, 45–46, 47, 48, 49
 - organizational, 44, 45–46, 48, 49, 54
 - safety, 48, 49
 - stress, 43, 45, 47, 48, 49, 52, 54
 - unfavorable treatment, 43, 47, 48, 52
 - work environment, 44, 45, 47, 48
- Uniform Crime Reports (UCR), 9, 10, 15
- U.S. Attorney's Office, 26
- U.S. Supreme Court, 80
- Utah, three-strikes law, 16
- Vermont,
 - state jail system, 75
 - three-strikes law, 16
- Virginia,
 - regional jails in, 74
 - three-strikes law, 16
- Washington County (Maryland)
 - Detention Center, 71
- Washington state, 11
 - regional jails in, 74
 - three-strikes law, 11, 16
- Weed and Seed program, 27–41
- West Virginia, 71, 74, 76
- West Virginia Regional Jail Authority, 74
- Wickersham Commission, 75
- Wisconsin, three-strikes law, 16
- Wyoming, 76
- Zero-tolerance policing, 30, 31, 32, 34–35, 37, 40